Plurality Versus Majority Election of Presidents: A Proposal for a “Double Complement Rule”
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Abstract
Under plurality rule, presidents may be elected with narrow support whenever there are more than two “serious” candidates. Even under majority-runoff rules, the eventual winner may have received the backing of only a small minority in the first round. This article shows that majority runoff rules tend to be associated with an “effective” number of presidential candidates greater than three. The effective number for plurality is, on average, less; however, a nontrivial share of such elections have resulted in close multicandidate races. The article proposes an alternative “double complement rule,” which is derived as the arithmetic average of majority runoff and plurality criteria. This rule stipulates that a front-runner with less than a majority of the votes wins without need of a second round if the shortfall of the runner-up from a majority of votes is more than double the leading candidate's shortfall from a majority. Possible effects and desirable conditions of this rule are assessed in light of the existing debate about electoral methods.
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Cites
Brams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C. (1978) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1955105 · Cited by 446
Cited by
The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government
Shugart, M. S. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082428 · Cited by 343
Self-citationSaideman, S. M., Lanoue, D. J., Campenni, M., & Stanton, S. (2002) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/001041400203500108 · Cited by 300
Making Constitutions: Presidents, Parties, and Institutional Choice in Latin America
Negretto, G. L. (2013) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139207836 · Cited by 239
The Rise of Outsiders in Latin America, 1980–2010: An Institutionalist Perspective
Carreras, M. (2012) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414012445753 · Cited by 123
“When they are eliminated from the race, the losing candidates have more leverage to negotiate their support in the second round against political privileges after the election (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Shugart & Taagepera, 1994).”
BackgroundElectoral Laws and the Effective Number of Candidates in Presidential Elections
Jones, M. P. (1999) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2647780 · Cited by 107
Metadata
- Authors
- SHUGART, M. S., & TAAGEPERA, R.
- Venue
- Comparative Political Studies
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1994-10
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 323-348
- ISSN
- 0010-4140 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-3829
- OpenAlex
- W2165948048
- Cited by
- 96
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 2.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- SHUGART, M. S., & TAAGEPERA, R. (1994). Plurality Versus Majority Election of Presidents: A Proposal for a “Double Complement Rule”. Comparative Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414094027003001
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