Cited by 107Electoral Systems and Political ParticipationGame Theory and Voting SystemsPolitical Dynamics in Latin America

Electoral Laws and the Effective Number of Candidates in Presidential Elections

Jones, Mark P.·1999·The Journal of Politics

Abstract

This study employs data from 33 countries over a 50-year period to analyze the institutional determinants of the effective number of presidential candidates. I find the presidential electoral formula-plurality versus majority runoff-to have a strong and significant impact on the effective number of candidates, thereby providing the most substantial support thus far for Duverger's propositions at the presidential level. Unlike previous cross-national studies, I also test for the effect of the presence or absence of an incumbent presidential candidate. The presence of an incumbent has a significant reductive effect on the effective number of candidates.

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Crossref · 10.2307/2647780

Cites

2 of 2 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Latin America is the region where presidentialism has most predominated, so political competition is structured around competition for the presidency.

    “América Latina es la región del mundo en la que más ha predominado el presidencialismo, por lo cual, en los países de esta región, la competencia política está estructurada en torno a la competencia por la presidencia”
  • Si un Presidente en ejercicio busca la reelección, es menos probable el ingreso de candidatos desafiantes y, en consecuencia, es esperable una menor entrada de candidatos.

    “Por otra parte, si un Presidente en ejercicio busca la reelección, es menos probable el ingreso de candidatos desafiantes (Jones 1999) y, en consecuencia, es esperable una menor entrada de candidatos.”
  • También es posible que sea la fragmentación legislativa la que incida sobre la competencia presidencial, como ha argumentado Jones (1999).

    “Sin embargo, también es posible que sea la fragmentación legislativa la que incida sobre la competencia presidencial, como razonablemente ha argumentado Jones (1999).”

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Cited by

Authors
Jones, M. P.
Affiliations
Michigan State University (US)
Corresponding author
Jones, Mark P.
Venue
The Journal of Politics
Published
1999-02
Volume
61
Issue
1
Pages
171-184
ISSN
  • 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-2508
OpenAlex
W2162767271
Cited by
107
References
2
Citations by year
2025: 5 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 8 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 9
FWCI
4.08
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
The Journal of Politics (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Dynamics in Latin America
Keywords
presidential elections, electoral systems, plurality rule, second-round election, Duverger's law, incumbency, candidate competition

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