Rules over Real Estate: Trade, Territorial Conflict, and International Borders as Institution
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Territorial disputes between governments generate a significant amount of uncertainty for economic actors. Settled boundary agreements produce benefits to economic agents on both sides of the border. These qualities of borders are missed both by realists, who view territorial conflicts in overly zero-sum terms, and globalists, who claim borders are increasingly irrelevant. Settled borders help to secure property rights, signal much greater jurisdictional and policy certainty, and thereby reduce the transactions costs associated with international economic transactions. The plausibility of this claim is examined by showing that territorial disputes involve significant economic opportunity costs in the form of foregone bilateral trade. Theories of territorial politics should take into account the possibility of such joint gains in their models of state dispute behavior.
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Citations
Cites
War and Change in World Politics
Gilpin, R. (1981) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511664267 · Cited by 4,020
Regional trading blocs in the world economic system
(1998) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.35-4604 · Cited by 1,045
Why are some international agreements informal?
Lipson, C. (1991) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033191 · Cited by 585 · cited 1×
“Publicly articulated arrangements of a formal nature (Abbott and Snidal 2000; Lipson 1991) are more likely to produce the confidence in resolution upon which our theory turns; Huth’s measure is therefore especially appropriate.”
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Cited by
Buixadé Farré, A., Stephenson, S. R., Chen, L., Czub, M., Dai, Y., Demchev, D., Efimov, Y., Graczyk, P., Grythe, H., Keil, K., et al. (2014) · Polar Geography · doi:10.1080/1088937x.2014.965769 · Cited by 313
The relevance of political affinity for the initial acquisition premium in cross‐border acquisitions
Bertrand, O., Betschinger, M., & Settles, A. (2016) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2438 · Cited by 191
Metadata
- Authors
- Simmons, B. A.
- Venue
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2005-12
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 823-848
- ISSN
- 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-8766
- OpenAlex
- W2002065917
- Cited by
- 197
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 1.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.