Why are some international agreements informal?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 115 of the 115 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Informal agreements are the most common form of international cooperation and the least studied. Ranging from simple oral deals to detailed executive agreements, they permit states to conclude profitable bargains without the formality of treaties. They differ from treaties in more than just a procedural sense. Treaties are designed, by long-standing convention, to raise the credibility of promises by staking national reputation on their adherence. Informal agreements have a more ambiguous status and are useful for precisely that reason. They are chosen to avoid formal and visible national pledges, to avoid the political obstacles of ratification, to reach agreements quickly and quietly, and to provide flexibility for subsequent modification or even renunciation. They differ from formal agreements not because their substance is less important (the Cuban missile crisis was solved by informal agreement) but because the underlying promises are less visible and more equivocal. The prevalence of such informal devices thus reveals not only the possibilities of international cooperation but also the practical obstacles and the institutional limits to endogenous enforcement.
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Cited by
Chayes, A., & Chayes, A. H. (1993) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300027910 · Cited by 1,002
Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000
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“…multiple signings per host , which leads us to frame the issue as one of credible commitments rather than costly signals that reveal type + Both frameworks could , however , explain a competitive dynamic to sign BITs + 32 + See Abbott et al + 2000 ; Lipson 1991 ; and Guzman 2002 + observed !”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lipson, C.
- Affiliations
- University of Chicago (US)
- Corresponding author
- Lipson, Charles
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1991
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 495-538
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2077729868
- Cited by
- 585
- References
- 115
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 37 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 29 · 2022: 34 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 61 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 31 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 19 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 23 · 2012: 25
- FWCI
- 22.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- International Organization (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Law and Aviation
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Historical Influence and Diplomacy
- Keywords
- informal agreements, executive agreements, treaties, international cooperation, treaty ratification, Cuban Missile Crisis
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- Lipson, C. (1991). Why are some international agreements informal? International Organization. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300033191
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