The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Domestic Political Costs of Economic Sanctions
Abstract
While a great deal of attention has been to paid to whether or not economic sanctions work, less energy has been devoted to exploring the causal mechanisms that lead to the success or failure of sanctions policies. Often, it is assumed that the population is one important source of political costs for targeted leaders, but this assumption has not been tested. Are sanctions related to an increase in antigovernment activity? How does the domestic political system of the targeted state affect the likelihood of this antigovernment behavior? The findings presented here suggest that sanctions may increase antigovernment activity, but that increase is mitigated by the domestic political structures of the target state. In autocratic targets, political violence is less likely to occur when sanctions are in place. For sanctions against autocratic states to be costly, it appears that the political costs needed to alter behavior must be generated internationally rather than domestically.
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Citations
Cites
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217
Making the most of statistical analyses: improving interpretation and presentation
King, G., Tomz, M., & Wittenberg, J. (2000) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669316 · Cited by 3,232
On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia
Galtung, J. (1967) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2009785 · Cited by 655
The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success and Failure
Allen, S. H. (2005) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050620590950097 · Cited by 147
Self-citation
Cited by
Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice
Drezner, D. W. (2011) · International Studies Review · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.01001.x · Cited by 411
The impact of UN and US economic sanctions on GDP growth
Neuenkirch, M., & Neumeier, F. (2015) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.09.001 · Cited by 349
Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy
Peksen, D., & Drury, A. C. (2010) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050629.2010.502436 · Cited by 265
Kobayashi, T., & Katagiri, A. (2018) · Journal of East Asian Studies · doi:10.1017/jea.2018.21 · Cited by 27
“Similar cases of the rally effect are found in economic sanctions on Cuba (Allen 2008) and Iraq (Inglehart, Moaddel, and Tessler 2006).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Allen, S. H.
- Venue
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2008-07-28
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 916-944
- ISSN
- 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-8766
- OpenAlex
- W2129764416
- Cited by
- 231
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 9.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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