The DOI matches its Crossref record; 85 of the 85 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations
Abstract
States in an international dispute sometimes choose to attack their enemies with their own military forces but other times choose to empower domestic insurgent groups. What explains the decision to act through rebel proxies rather than directly engage a rival? Theories and empirical analyses of international conflict have adopted a state-centric bias, ignoring the substitution between direct uses of force and indirect action through rebel organizations. This note examines the decision to delegate conflict to rebels through the lens of principal—agent theory. While states support rebel groups to forgo some of the costs of conflict, they also lose a degree of foreign policy autonomy. Preliminary evidence of conflict delegation is presented, along with a number of empirically testable propositions. Finally, the consequences of delegation from the rebels’ perspective are explored. This framework serves as a starting point for future research on rebel—patron interactions.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Theory of International Politics
Frankel, J., & Waltz, K. N. (1980) · International Journal · doi:10.2307/40201892 · Cited by 8,506
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
FEARON, J. D., & LAITIN, D. D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000534 · Cited by 7,366
Theory of International Politics, by Kenneth N. Waltz
Randle, R. F. (1980) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2149594 · Cited by 6,358
Greed and grievance in civil war
Collier, P. (2004) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oep/gpf064 · Cited by 6,101
Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics
Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (2014) · Cornell University Press eBooks · doi:10.7591/9780801471292 · Cited by 4,627
From Mobilization to Revolution
Stearns, P. N., & Tilly, C. (1979) · The American Historical Review · doi:10.2307/1855671 · Cited by 4,546
From Mobilization to Revolution
Tilly, C. (2017) · Collective Violence, Contentious Politics, and Social Change · doi:10.4324/9781315205021-5 · Cited by 3,999
Rationalist explanations for war
Fearon, J. D. (1995) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033324 · Cited by 3,995
Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset
GLEDITSCH, N. P., WALLENSTEEN, P., ERIKSSON, M., SOLLENBERG, M., & STRAND, H. (2002) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343302039005007 · Cited by 3,846 · cited 1×
“…however, interstate wars fought between national armies have declined in frequency and severity (Väyrynen 2006; Zacher 2001), whereas the most significant threats to incumbent regimes stem not from other governments but from internal challengers and insurgent groups (N. P. Gleditsch et al. 2002).”
BackgroundActivists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics
Fukuyama, F., Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20048985 · Cited by 3,700
Cited by
Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups
Salehyan, I., Gleditsch, K. S., & Cunningham, D. E. (2011) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818311000233 · Cited by 391
Self-citationExternalizing the burden of war: the Obama Doctrine and US foreign policy in the Middle East
KRIEG, A. (2016) · International Affairs · doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12506 · Cited by 96
(2016) · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- Salehyan, I.
- Venue
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2010-01-07
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 493-515
- ISSN
- 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-8766
- OpenAlex
- W2090595616
- Cited by
- 252
- References
- 85
- FWCI
- 17.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/0022002709357890
- The paper
- Salehyan, I. (2010). The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002709357890
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.