The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights
Abstract
Does economic coercion increase or decrease government respect for human rights in countries targeted with economic sanctions? If economic sanctions weaken the target regime's coercive capacity, human rights violations by the government should be less likely. If, on the contrary, sanctions fail to attenuate the coercive capacity of the target elites and create more economic difficulties and political violence among ordinary citizens, the government will likely commit more human rights violations. Focusing on competing views of why sanctions might improve or deteriorate human rights conditions, this article offers an empirical examination of the effect sanctions have on the physical integrity rights of citizens in target countries. Utilizing time-series, cross-national data for the period 1981—2000, the findings suggest that economic sanctions worsen government respect for physical integrity rights, including freedom from disappearances, extra-judicial killings, torture, and political imprisonment. The results also show that extensive sanctions are more detrimental to human rights than partial/selective sanctions. Economic coercion remains a counterproductive policy tool, even when sanctions are specifically imposed with the goal of improving human rights. Finally, multilateral sanctions have a greater overall negative impact on human rights than unilateral sanctions.
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Cites
What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data
Beck, N., & Katz, J. N. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082979 · Cited by 6,840
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217
On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia
Galtung, J. (1967) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2009785 · Cited by 655
Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996
Davenport, C., & Armstrong, D. A. (2004) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00086.x · Cited by 652
Davenport, C. (1995) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111650 · Cited by 623
The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship
Wintrobe, R. (1990) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1962769 · Cited by 430
Cited by
Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice
Drezner, D. W. (2011) · International Studies Review · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.01001.x · Cited by 411
The impact of UN and US economic sanctions on GDP growth
Neuenkirch, M., & Neumeier, F. (2015) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.09.001 · Cited by 349
Economic Sanctions, Poverty, and International Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis
Choi, S.-W., & Luo, S. (2013) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050629.2013.768478 · Cited by 91
Metadata
- Authors
- Peksen, D.
- Venue
- Journal of Peace Research
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2009-01-01
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 59-77
- ISSN
- 0022-3433 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-3578
- OpenAlex
- W2111056911
- Cited by
- 364
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 11.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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