The DOI matches its Crossref record.
A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government
Abstract
Revenue-seeking governments may well find it to their advantage to strike bargains with citizens whose assets they seek to tax. To induce a greater willingness to pay taxes, they may defer to the citizens’ policy preferences. Such bargains may become more beneficial from the citizens’ point of view the more mobile the assets the citizens hold. These claims form the central themes of this paper.
Overview
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Citations
Cited by
Ross, M. L. (2001) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.2001.0011 · Cited by 3,409
What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?
Ross, M. L. (2015) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359 · Cited by 1,146
Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability
Morrison, K. M. (2009) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818309090043 · Cited by 594
Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule
HAGGARD, S., & KAUFMAN, R. R. (2012) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055412000287 · Cited by 300
When Distance Mattered: Geographic Scale and the Development of European Representative Assemblies
STASAVAGE, D. (2010) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000444 · Cited by 201
Metadata
- Authors
- Bates, R. H., & Donald Lien, D.-H.
- Venue
- Politics & Society
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1985-03
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 53-70
- ISSN
- 0032-3292 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-7514
- OpenAlex
- W2082517482
- Cited by
- 636
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 4.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/003232928501400102
- The paper
- Bates, R. H., & Donald Lien, D.-H. (1985). A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government. Politics & Society. https://doi.org/10.1177/003232928501400102
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
