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Cited by 1,146Natural Resources and Economic DevelopmentPolitical Conflict and GovernanceCorruption and Economic Development

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What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?

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Ross, Michael L.·2015·Annual Review of Political Science
DOI 10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359
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Abstract

Since 2001, hundreds of academic studies have examined the “political resource curse,” meaning the claim that natural resource wealth tends to adversely affect a country's governance. There is now robust evidence that one type of mineral wealth, petroleum, has at least three harmful effects: It tends to make authoritarian regimes more durable, to increase certain types of corruption, and to help trigger violent conflict in low- and middle-income countries. Scholars have also made progress toward understanding the mechanisms that lead to these outcomes and the conditions that make them more likely. This essay reviews the evidence behind these claims, the debates over their validity, and some of the unresolved puzzles for future research.

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  • The original resource-curse argument fails to take the endogeneity of oil extraction into account.

    “Furthermore, the original argument fails to take the obvious endogeneity of oil extraction into account (Ross 2015), and also overlooks that petroleum revenues may actually reduce conflict by helping governments bribe or suppress the opposition (Paine 2016).”

    From Dynamics and Logics of Civil War (2017) · cites this paper as Ross 2015

  • The link between oil and civil war operates primarily through an ethnoregional mechanism.

    “recent studies demonstrate that the link between oil and civil war operates primarily through an ethnoregional mechanism (Hunziker and Cederman 2017, cf. Ross 2015).”

    From Dynamics and Logics of Civil War (2017) · cites this paper as Ross 2015

  • In mineral-rich conflict-affected countries, securing control over resource deposits often becomes an end in itself, creating a distinct war economy that prolongs the fighting.

    “In mineral-rich conflict-affected countries, securing control over resource deposits (oil fields, artisanal gemstone mines) often becomes an end in itself, creating a distinct war economy that prolongs the fighting (134-136).”

    From Vicious Circles: Violence, Vulnerability, and Climate Change (2021) · cites this paper as [136]

  • Many low and middle-income countries experience a stark contrast between the hopes raised by their natural resource endowments and the everyday reality of deprivation that many people face.

    “Many low and middle-income countries experience a stark contrast between the hopes raised by their natural resource endowments and the everyday reality of deprivation that many people face.”

    From Reconsidering Sovereignty, Ownership and Consent in Natural Resource Contracts: From Concepts to Practice (2018) · cites this paper as Ross (2015)

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Metadata

Authors
Ross, M. L.
Affiliations
University of California, Los Angeles (US)
Corresponding author
Ross, Michael L.
ORCID
Ross, Michael L.
Venue
Annual Review of Political Science
Publisher
Annual Reviews
Published
2015-05-11
Volume
18
Issue
1
Pages
239-259
ISSN
  • 1094-2939 (ISSN-L)
  • 1545-1577
DOI
10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359
OpenAlex
W3125670285
Cited by
1,146
References
7
Citations by year
2026: 96 · 2025: 99 · 2024: 132 · 2023: 136 · 2022: 114 · 2021: 164 · 2020: 157 · 2019: 75 · 2018: 84 · 2017: 46 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 17
FWCI
13.64
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Annual Review of Political Science (publishedVersion)
  • eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Natural Resources and Economic Development
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
Keywords
resource curse, natural resource wealth, oil wealth, authoritarianism, regime durability, corruption, violent conflict, governance, low- and middle-income countries

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