Utopian Hopes or Dystopian Fears? Exploring the Motivational Underpinnings of Moralized Political Engagement
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
People are more likely to become politically engaged (e.g., vote, engage in activism) when issues are associated with strong moral convictions. The goal of this research was to understand the underlying motivations that lead to this well-replicated effect. Specifically, to what extent is moralized political engagement motivated by proscriptive concerns (e.g., perceived harms, anticipated regret), prescriptive concerns (e.g., perceived benefits, anticipated pride), or some combination of these processes? And are the motivational pathways between moral conviction and political engagement the same or different for liberals and conservatives? Two studies (combined N = 2,069) found that regardless of political orientation, the association between moral conviction and political engagement was mediated by the perceived benefits of preferred but not the perceived harms of non-preferred policy outcomes, and by both anticipated pride and regret, findings that replicated in two contexts: legalizing same-sex marriage and allowing concealed weapons on college campuses.
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Citations
Cites
Political conservatism as motivated social cognition.
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339 · Cited by 4,904
Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior
Tangney, J. P., Stuewig, J., & Mashek, D. J. (2007) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070145 · Cited by 3,222
The Hierarchical Model of Approach-Avoidance Motivation
Elliot, A. J. (2006) · Motivation and Emotion · doi:10.1007/s11031-006-9028-7 · Cited by 1,385 · cited 1×
“Ideological symmetry in prescriptive and proscriptive motivations may be especially likely, given that approach and avoidance states are so fundamental and basic to human (and animal) physical and psychological adaptation (Elliot, 2006).”
BackgroundThe experience of regret: What, when, and why.
Gilovich, T., & Medvec, V. H. (1995) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.102.2.379 · Cited by 1,098 · cited 1×
“Anticipated regret, for example, is an aversive reaction based on people’s feelings about how much they will regret inaction (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995).”
BackgroundConsequences of prejudice against the null hypothesis.
Greenwald, A. G. (1975) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/h0076157 · Cited by 1,022 · cited 1×
“…motivations cannot be completely ruled out, the results of these studies nonetheless shift the burden of proof to those who argue that liberals’ and conservatives’ moral motivations are fundamentally different (see Greenwald, 1975, on the power of null hypothesis results to shift burdens of proof).”
ResultMind Perception Is the Essence of Morality
Gray, K., Young, L., & Waytz, A. (2012) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2012.651387 · Cited by 1,008 · cited 2×
“, Haidt, 2008) or a narrow focus on harm (Gray et al., 2012).”
BackgroundMoral Conviction: Another Contributor to Attitude Strength or Something More?
Skitka, L. J., Bauman, C. W., & Sargis, E. G. (2005) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.88.6.895 · Cited by 828
Self-citation
Cited by
The Psychology of Moral Conviction
Skitka, L. J., Hanson, B. E., Morgan, G. S., & Wisneski, D. C. (2021) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-063020-030612 · Cited by 454
Self-citationAgostini, M., & van Zomeren, M. (2021) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/bul0000256 · Cited by 301
“But other work might not conceptually include system justification as part of the moral domain (e.g., Skitka et al., 2017) or has not found empirical traces of it as part of people’s everyday experiences of morality (Hofmann et al., 2014).”
BackgroundMoralization in social networks and the emergence of violence during protests
Mooijman, M., Hoover, J., Lin, Y., Ji, H., & Dehghani, M. (2018) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0353-0 · Cited by 229
A new measure of affective polarization
CAMPOS, N., & FEDERICO, C. (2026) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055425000255 · Cited by 18
“” (moralization; Skitka, Hanson, and Wisneski 2017) and “ People from other cultures act strange when they come to my culture ” (othering; Neuliep and McCroskey 1997) were used and adapted for the present study.”
Metadata
- Authors
- Skitka, L. J., Hanson, B. E., & Wisneski, D. C.
- Venue
- Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2016-11-23
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 177-190
- ISSN
- 0146-1672 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-7433
- OpenAlex
- W2556513425
- Cited by
- 67
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 2.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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