Hindsight Distortion and the 1980 Presidential Election
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Abstract
The tendency for people retrospectively to overestimate the degree to which they expected certain events to occur was examined within the context of the 1980 presidential election. Previous research has concluded that distorted hindsight occurs due to people's inability to reconstruct prior probabilities for an event after it has occurred, but the possible mediation of motivational factors, specifically self-esteem and self-presentation, has not been adequately examined. Subjects were asked either before or after the 1980 presidential election, and under public or private response conditions, to predict the outcome of the election (preelection) or to indicate what they would have predicted the outcome to be had they been asked before the election (postelection). In addition, subjects were classified as being either high or low in ego involvement regarding knowledge of politics. Results showed clear evidence of hindsight distortion: Subjects asked after the election said they woud have predicted an outcome closer to the results of the election than those asked before, but there was no evidence of mediation by self-esteem or self presentation concerns.
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Cites
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Cited by
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.93.2.136 · Cited by 3,024
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Metadata
- Authors
- Leary, M. R.
- Venue
- Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1982-06
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 257-263
- ISSN
- 0146-1672 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-7433
- OpenAlex
- W2002358564
- Cited by
- 148
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 1.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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