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Fairness as Appropriateness: Negotiating Epistemological Differences in Peer Review

Open access
Mallard, Grégoire, Lamont, Michèle, Guetzkow, Joshua · 2009 · Science, Technology, & Human Values
Cited by 124

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Epistemological differences fuel continuous and frequently divisive debates in the social sciences and the humanities. Sociologists have yet to consider how such differences affect peer evaluation. The empirical literature has studied distributive fairness, but neglected how epistemological differences affect perception of fairness in decision making. The normative literature suggests that evaluators should overcome their epistemological differences by ‘‘translating’’ their preferred standards into general criteria of evaluation. However, little is known about how procedural fairness actually operates. Drawing on eighty-one interviews with panelists serving on five multidisciplinary fellowship competitions in the social sciences and the humanities, we show that (1) Evaluators generally draw on four epistemological styles to make arguments in favor of and against proposals. These are the constructivist, comprehensive, positivist, and utilitarian styles; and (2) Peer reviewers define a fair decision-making process as one in which panelists engage in ‘‘cognitive contextualization,’’ that is, use epistemological styles most appropriate to the field or discipline of the proposal under review.

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Crossref · 10.1177/0162243908329381

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Metadata

Authors
Mallard, G., Lamont, M., & Guetzkow, J.
Venue
Science, Technology, & Human Values
Published
2009-02-10
Volume
34
Issue
5
Pages
573-606
ISSN
  • 0162-2439 (ISSN-L)
  • 1552-8251
OpenAlex
W2113026508
Cited by
124
References
6
FWCI
14.43
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Fairness as Appropriateness: Negotiating Epistemological Differences in Peer Review. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/0162243908329381
The paper
Mallard, G., Lamont, M., & Guetzkow, J. (2009). Fairness as Appropriateness: Negotiating Epistemological Differences in Peer Review. Science, Technology, & Human Values. https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243908329381

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.