The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Attributing False Beliefs About Object Identity Reveals a Signature Blind Spot in Humans’ Efficient Mind-Reading System
Abstract
How can human beings make significant but cognitively taxing inferences about others’ beliefs yet also effectively “mind read” in fast-moving social situations? We tested the idea that humans have two mind-reading systems: a flexible system and an efficient system that can make fast calculations because it has natural blind spots to the kinds of input it processes. We showed that the automatic gaze anticipations of 3-year-olds, 4-year-olds, and adults displayed a signature blind spot specific to calculating an actor’s false belief about object identity—a calculation that required the complex understanding that an object can be interpreted differently depending on one’s visual perspective. Participants’ deliberate verbal inferences demonstrated significant flexibility in calculations of another person’s beliefs. Our results show that quick, efficient mind reading eschews conceptual sophistication.
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Wimmer, H. (1983) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(83)90004-5 · Cited by 6,305
Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states
Apperly, I. A., & Butterfill, S. A. (2009) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0016923 · Cited by 1,261
Action Anticipation Through Attribution of False Belief by 2-Year-Olds
Southgate, V., Senju, A., & Csibra, G. (2007) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01944.x · Cited by 1,066
False-belief understanding in infants
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Which Penguin Is This? Attributing False Beliefs About Object Identity at 18 Months
Scott, R. M., & Baillargeon, R. (2009) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01324.x · Cited by 352
Cited by
Submentalizing: I Am Not Really Reading Your Mind
Heyes, C. (2014) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691613518076 · Cited by 421
From infants’ to children's appreciation of belief
Perner, J., & Roessler, J. (2012) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.08.004 · Cited by 300
Annual Research Review: Towards a developmental neuroscience of atypical social cognition
Happé, F., & Frith, U. (2014) · Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry · doi:10.1111/jcpp.12162 · Cited by 293
Psychological reasoning in infancy
Baillargeon, R., Scott, R. M., & Bian, L. (2016) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115033 · Cited by 263
Great apes use self-experience to anticipate an agent’s action in a false-belief test
Kano, F., Krupenye, C., Hirata, S., Tomonaga, M., & Call, J. (2019) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1910095116 · Cited by 247
Metadata
- Authors
- Low, J., & Watts, J.
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2013-01-10
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 305-311
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2069161284
- Cited by
- 198
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 40.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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