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Submentalizing: I Am Not Really Reading Your Mind

Heyes, Cecilia·2014·Perspectives on Psychological Science

Abstract

The nativist view of mentalizing—the view that humans have an inherent capacity to think about the mental states of others—has been recently reinvigorated by reports that adults and infants automatically represent mental states—that they engage in implicit mentalizing. In this article, I take a close look at the strongest evidence of implicit mentalizing in adults, which suggests that people automatically represent what others see, intend, and believe. I argue that although these experiments have been ingeniously designed and carefully implemented, they do not provide evidence of implicit mentalizing because their results could be due instead to submentalizing—domain-general cognitive mechanisms that simulate the effects of mentalizing in social contexts. These include the processes that mediate involuntary attentional orienting, spatial coding of response locations, object-centered spatial coding of stimulus locations, retroactive interference, and distraction. If my analysis is correct, it suggests that the same domain-general processes can provide a fast and efficient alternative to mentalizing in everyday life, allowing people to navigate a wide range of social situations without thinking about mental states. Thus, submentalizing could be both a substrate and a substitute for mentalizing.

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Metadata

Authors
Heyes, C.
Venue
Perspectives on Psychological Science
Published
2014-03
Volume
9
Issue
2
Pages
131-143
ISSN
  • 1745-6916 (ISSN-L)
  • 1745-6924
OpenAlex
W2102411706
Cited by
421
References
51
FWCI
49.02
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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Heyes, C. (2014). Submentalizing: I Am Not Really Reading Your Mind. Perspectives on Psychological Science. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691613518076

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