The DOI matches its Crossref record; 51 of the 51 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Submentalizing: I Am Not Really Reading Your Mind
Abstract
The nativist view of mentalizing—the view that humans have an inherent capacity to think about the mental states of others—has been recently reinvigorated by reports that adults and infants automatically represent mental states—that they engage in implicit mentalizing. In this article, I take a close look at the strongest evidence of implicit mentalizing in adults, which suggests that people automatically represent what others see, intend, and believe. I argue that although these experiments have been ingeniously designed and carefully implemented, they do not provide evidence of implicit mentalizing because their results could be due instead to submentalizing—domain-general cognitive mechanisms that simulate the effects of mentalizing in social contexts. These include the processes that mediate involuntary attentional orienting, spatial coding of response locations, object-centered spatial coding of stimulus locations, retroactive interference, and distraction. If my analysis is correct, it suggests that the same domain-general processes can provide a fast and efficient alternative to mentalizing in everyday life, allowing people to navigate a wide range of social situations without thinking about mental states. Thus, submentalizing could be both a substrate and a substitute for mentalizing.
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Cites
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Cited by
Deconstructing and reconstructing theory of mind
Schaafsma, S. M., Pfaff, D. W., Spunt, R. P., & Adolphs, R. (2015) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2014.11.007 · Cited by 498
The cultural evolution of mind reading
Heyes, C. M., & Frith, C. D. (2014) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1243091 · Cited by 456
Self-citationHow attention gates social interactions
Capozzi, F., & Ristic, J. (2018) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/nyas.13854 · Cited by 385
What Do Theory-of-Mind Tasks Actually Measure? Theory and Practice
Quesque, F., & Rossetti, Y. (2020) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691619896607 · Cited by 287
Theory of mind in animals: current and future directions
Krupenye, C., & Call, J. (2019) · WIREs Cognitive Science · doi:10.1002/wcs.1503 · Cited by 180
Metadata
- Authors
- Heyes, C.
- Venue
- Perspectives on Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2014-03
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 131-143
- ISSN
- 1745-6916 (ISSN-L)
- 1745-6924
- OpenAlex
- W2102411706
- Cited by
- 421
- References
- 51
- FWCI
- 49.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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