The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Intentional Harms Are Worse, Even When They’re Not
Open accessAbstract
People and societies seek to combat harmful events. However, because resources are limited, every wrong righted leaves another wrong left unchecked. Responses must therefore be calibrated to the magnitude of the harm. One underappreciated factor that affects this calibration may be people’s oversensitivity to intent. Across a series of studies, people saw intended harms as worse than unintended harms, even though the two harms were identical. This harm-magnification effect occurred for both subjective and monetary estimates of harm, and it remained when participants were given incentives to be accurate. The effect was fully mediated by blame motivation. People may therefore focus on intentional harms to the neglect of unintentional (but equally damaging) harms.
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Cites
The case for motivated reasoning.
Kunda, Z. (1990) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480 · Cited by 9,022
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
Running experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk
Paolacci, G., Chandler, J., & Ipeirotis, P. G. (2010) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500002205 · Cited by 3,767
Conducting behavioral research on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
Mason, W., & Suri, S. (2012) · Behavior Research Methods · doi:10.3758/s13428-011-0124-6 · Cited by 3,172
Blaming God for our pain: Human suffering and the divine mind
Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. (2010) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868309350299 · Cited by 267
An fMRI Investigation of Spontaneous Mental State Inference for Moral Judgment
Young, L., & Saxe, R. (2009) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn.2009.21137 · Cited by 208
Cited by
The Theory of Dyadic Morality: Reinventing Moral Judgment by Redefining Harm
Schein, C., & Gray, K. (2018) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868317698288 · Cited by 659
Malle, B. F., Guglielmo, S., & Monroe, A. E. (2014) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2014.877340 · Cited by 632
The myth of harmless wrongs in moral cognition: Automatic dyadic completion from sin to suffering.
Gray, K., Schein, C., & Ward, A. F. (2014) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/a0036149 · Cited by 309
Koch, A., Imhoff, R., Dotsch, R., Unkelbach, C., & Alves, H. (2016) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/pspa0000046 · Cited by 309
Revenge: a multilevel review and synthesis
Jackson, J. C., Choi, V. K., & Gelfand, M. J. (2019) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010418-103305 · Cited by 172
Metadata
- Authors
- Ames, D. L., & Fiske, S. T.
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2013-07-22
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- 1755-1762
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2133256113
- Cited by
- 163
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 5.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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