Cited by 209Psychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentAction Observation and SynchronizationNeural and Behavioral Psychology Studies

An fMRI Investigation of Spontaneous Mental State Inference for Moral Judgment

Open access
Young, Liane, Saxe, Rebecca·2009·Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience

Abstract

Human moral judgment depends critically on “theory of mind,” the capacity to represent the mental states of agents. Recent studies suggest that the right TPJ (RTPJ) and, to lesser extent, the left TPJ (LTPJ), the precuneus (PC), and the medial pFC (MPFC) are robustly recruited when participants read explicit statements of an agent's beliefs and then judge the moral status of the agent's action. Real-world interactions, by contrast, often require social partners to infer each other's mental states. The current study uses fMRI to probe the role of these brain regions in supporting spontaneous mental state inference in the service of moral judgment. Participants read descriptions of a protagonist's action and then either (i) “moral” facts about the action's effect on another person or (ii) “nonmoral” facts about the situation. The RTPJ, PC, and MPFC were recruited selectively for moral over nonmoral facts, suggesting that processing moral stimuli elicits spontaneous mental state inference. In a second experiment, participants read the same scenarios, but explicit statements of belief preceded the facts: Protagonists believed their actions would cause harm or not. The response in the RTPJ, PC, and LTPJ was again higher for moral facts but also distinguished between neutral and negative outcomes. Together, the results illuminate two aspects of theory of mind in moral judgment: (1) spontaneous belief inference and (2) stimulus-driven belief integration.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1162/jocn.2009.21137

Cites

55 of 55 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

We couldn’t retrieve this paper’s full text, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Young, L., & Saxe, R.
Affiliations
  • Harvard University (US)
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
Venue
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
Published
2009-07-01
Volume
21
Issue
7
Pages
1396-1405
ISSN
  • 0898-929X (ISSN-L)
  • 1530-8898
OpenAlex
W2142847572
Cited by
208
References
54
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 16 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 18 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 18
FWCI
6.21
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by-nc
Locations
  • Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
Funders
National Science Foundation
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
Keywords
moral judgment, theory of mind, mental state inference, right temporoparietal junction, precuneus, medial prefrontal cortex, moral facts, social cognition
MeSH terms
Adolescent, Analysis of Variance, Brain Mapping, Concept Formation, Culture, Female, Humans, Image Processing, Computer-Assisted, Judgment, Functional Laterality, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Male, Morals, Neuropsychological Tests, Oxygen, Parietal Lobe, Reaction Time, Social Perception, Young Adult

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review