A theory of blame
Abstract
We introduce a theory of blame in five parts. Part 1 addresses what blame is: a unique moral judgment that is both cognitive and social, regulates social behavior, fundamentally relies on social cognition, and requires warrant. Using these properties, we distinguish blame from such phenomena as anger, event evaluation, and wrongness judgments. Part 2 offers the heart of the theory: the Path Model of Blame, which identifies the conceptual structure in which blame judgments are embedded and the information processing that generates such judgments. After reviewing evidence for the Path Model, we contrast it with alternative models of blame and moral judgment (Part 3) and use it to account for a number of challenging findings in the literature (Part 4). Part 5 moves from blame as a cognitive judgment to blame as a social act. We situate social blame in the larger family of moral criticism, highlight its communicative nature, and discuss the darker sides of moral criticism. Finally, we show how the Path Model of Blame can bring order to numerous tools of blame management, including denial, justification, and excuse.
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Personal power distance beliefs moderate the relationship between vicarious abusive supervision and observer attributions.
“Personal power distance beliefs moderate the relationship between vicarious abusive supervision and observer attributions.”
From Blame or Justification: A Conceptual Model of How Attributions Shape Observers’ Deviant Responses to Abusive Supervision (2026) · cites this paper as Malle et al., 2014
Higher power distance beliefs strengthen the positive relationship between vicarious abusive supervision and justification attributions.
“(b) strengthen the positive relationship between vicarious abusive supervision and justification attributions.”
From Blame or Justification: A Conceptual Model of How Attributions Shape Observers’ Deviant Responses to Abusive Supervision (2026) · cites this paper as Malle et al., 2014
Higher power distance beliefs weaken the positive relationship between vicarious abusive supervision and responsibility attributions.
“Specifically, higher power distance beliefs will (a) weaken the positive relationship between vicarious abusive supervision and responsibility attributions”
From Blame or Justification: A Conceptual Model of How Attributions Shape Observers’ Deviant Responses to Abusive Supervision (2026) · cites this paper as Malle et al., 2014
The actor who intentionally committed abusive actions and had the ability to control them was blamed by an observer.
“The actor, who intentionally committed abusive actions (Jones & Davis, 1965; Malle et al., 2014) and had the ability to control them (Weiner, 1979), was blamed by an observer.”
From Blame or Justification: A Conceptual Model of How Attributions Shape Observers’ Deviant Responses to Abusive Supervision (2026) · cites this paper as Malle et al., 2014
The attribution of responsibility is based on the tendency to view the act as unwanted or morally false.
“the attribution of responsibility is based on the tendency to view the act as unwanted or morally false.”
From Blame or Justification: A Conceptual Model of How Attributions Shape Observers’ Deviant Responses to Abusive Supervision (2026) · cites this paper as Malle et al., 2014
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Feeling our way to machine minds: people's emotions when perceiving mind in artificial intelligence
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- Authors
- Malle, B. F., Guglielmo, S., & Monroe, A. E.
- Affiliations
- Brown University (US)
- Macalester College (US)
- Florida State University (US)
- Venue
- Psychological Inquiry
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2014-04-03
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 147-186
- ISSN
- 1047-840X (ISSN-L)
- 1532-7965
- OpenAlex
- W2013522791
- Cited by
- 632
- References
- 15
- Citations by year
- 2026: 51 · 2025: 77 · 2024: 71 · 2023: 66 · 2022: 58 · 2021: 67 · 2020: 45 · 2019: 50 · 2018: 41 · 2017: 41 · 2016: 37 · 2015: 23 · 2014: 5
- FWCI
- 19.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Psychological Inquiry (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Emotions and Moral Behavior
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Forgiveness and Related Behaviors
- Keywords
- blame, moral judgment, social cognition, moral criticism, justification, excuses, denial, anger, event evaluation, warrants
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