Why Hate the Good Guy? Antisocial Punishment of High Cooperators Is Greater When People Compete To Be Chosen
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 43 of the 43 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
When choosing social partners, people prefer good cooperators (all else being equal). Given this preference, people wishing to be chosen can either increase their own cooperation to become more desirable or suppress others’ cooperation to make them less desirable. Previous research shows that very cooperative people sometimes get punished (“antisocial punishment”) or criticized (“do-gooder derogation”) in many cultures. Here, we used a public-goods game with punishment to test whether antisocial punishment is used as a means of competing to be chosen by suppressing others’ cooperation. As predicted, there was more antisocial punishment when participants were competing to be chosen for a subsequent cooperative task (a trust game) than without a subsequent task. This difference in antisocial punishment cannot be explained by differences in contributions, moralistic punishment, or confusion. This suggests that antisocial punishment is a social strategy that low cooperators use to avoid looking bad when high cooperators escalate cooperation.
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“This combination can also result in competition between agents, which has been associated with the development of unjust punishment of cooperators, potentially detrimental to the emergence of cooperation [34].”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [34]
In the citing paper
“unjust punishment of cooperators is per-”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [34]
Citations
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“Anti‐social punishment refers to the punishment of cooperators by non‐cooperators (Nikiforakis, 2008), often driven by the punisher's desire to protect one's self‐ interests by lowering the well‐being of potential competitors (Pleasant & Barclay, 2018; Rand & Nowak, 2011).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Pleasant, A., & Barclay, P.
- Affiliations
- University of Guelph (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Barclay, Pat
- ORCID
- Barclay, Pat
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2018-04-30
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 868-876
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2802616481
- Cited by
- 60
- References
- 43
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 12 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 11.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
- Locations
- Psychological Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (430287)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Keywords
- antisocial punishment, cooperation, public goods game, trust game, social reputation
- MeSH terms
- Adolescent, Adult, Altruism, Competitive Behavior, Cooperative Behavior, Female, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Punishment, Social Desirability, Young Adult
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- Pleasant, A., & Barclay, P. (2018). Why Hate the Good Guy? Antisocial Punishment of High Cooperators Is Greater When People Compete To Be Chosen. Psychological Science. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797617752642
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