Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
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Group boundaries based on persistent cultural differences between groups are a condition of cultural-group selection.
“Group boundaries based on persistent cultural differences between groups are a condition of cultural-group selection (Boyd, 2018: 98-99;Henrich, 2004;Muthukrishna, 2025: 195-197).”
From Durkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality (2026) · cites this paper as Henrich, 2004
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The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
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“The operational details of these learning mechanisms appear to have been 'designed' by natural selection to extract useful information from the social world—that is, from the minds of other individuals (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich and Gil-White, 2001; Henrich and Boyd, 1998).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationThe evolution of altruistic punishment
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Compassion: an evolutionary analysis and empirical review
Goetz, J. L., Keltner, D., & Simon-Thomas, E. (2010) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0018807 · Cited by 2,200 · see citing works
“In this way, the evolved capacity to feel compassion may function like a language acquisition tendency (Henrich, 2004; Richerson & Boyd, 2005) and may vary in ways that are analogous to how languages differ across cultures, according to culturally specific concepts, values, norms, and practices (Clark, 1997; Hoshchild…”
BackgroundInfluentialAntisocial Punishment Across Societies
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C., & Gächter, S. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1153808 · Cited by 2,038 · see citing works
“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., Alvard, M., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., et al. (2005) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x05000142 · Cited by 1,898 · see citing works
Self-citationCostly Punishment Across Human Societies
Henrich, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J. C., Gurven, M., Gwako, E., Henrich, N., et al. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1127333 · Cited by 1,771 · see citing works
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Gürerk, O., Irlenbusch, B., & Rockenbach, B. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1123633 · Cited by 997 · see citing works
INTERDEPENDENT PREFERENCES AND RECIPROCITY
Sobel, J. (2005) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/0022051054661530 · Cited by 985 · see citing works
“Henrich (2004) and Sober and Wilson (1998) discuss”
BackgroundInfluentialNatural pedagogy as evolutionary adaptation
Csibra, G., & Gergely, G. (2011) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0319 · Cited by 970 · see citing works
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Chudek, M., & Henrich, J. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.03.003 · Cited by 739 · see citing works
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Frey, B. S., & Torgler, B. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.900359 · Cited by 739 · see citing works
“Henrich (2004) provides an overview of another promising concept, namely conformity.”
BackgroundThe evolution of costly displays, cooperation and religion
Henrich, J. (2009) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.03.005 · Cited by 693 · see citing works
“This kind of CGS, involving competition among stable states, suffers none of the problems typically associated with application of genetic group selection to the evolution of altruism (Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundSelf-citationBauer, M., Blattman, C., Chytilová, J., Henrich, J., Miguel, E., & Mitts, T. (2016) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.1257/jep.30.3.249 · Cited by 684 · see citing works
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Towards a unified science of cultural evolution.
Mesoudi, A., Whiten, A., & Laland, K. (2006) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x06009083 · Cited by 662 · see citing works
“Significantly, recent literature rehabilitates group selection in culture as a higher-level complement to individual-level selection (Henrich 2004a).”
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Laland, K., Sterelny, K., Odling-Smee, J., Hoppitt, W., & Uller, T. (2011) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1210879 · Cited by 557 · see citing works
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“But ultimately, norms are shaped through the interaction of various social and evolutionary forces [33, 63].”
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“…through the adaptive advantages of social foraging, collective strategies for warfare and defense, material exchange, and even the collaborative advantages of language (Boyd and Richerson 1985, Henrich 2004, Bowles 2006, 2009, Laland et al. 2010, Apicella et al. 2012, Rand and Nowak 2014).”
BackgroundKock, N. (2004) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1040.0071 · Cited by 526 · see citing works
“The notion that culture and genes coevolve has been gaining increasing acceptance recently (see, e.g., Henrich 2004 and the responses published in the same journal issue), particularly among biological anthropologists.”
BackgroundMoralizing religions: Prosocial or a privilege of wealth?
Norenzayan, A., Shariff, A. F., Gervais, W. M., Willard, A., McNamara, R., Slingerland, E., & Henrich, J. (2014) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x15000400 · Cited by 523
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“Let us consider her discussion of cultural group selection, which draws little from more established discussions (e.g., Boyd & Richerson 2002; Wilson 2002; Henrich 2004; Smaldino 2014; Zefferman & Mathew 2015; Richerson et al. 2016).”
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“The findings reviewed here, in particular those from the crosscultural experiments, support anthropological and evolutionary theories of cooperation which predict that people's social preferences are programmable and therefore culturally variable ( Henrich 2004; Henrich et al. 2005).”
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Baumard, N., André, J., & Sperber, D. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11002202 · Cited by 671 · see citing works
Do you believe in atheists? Distrust is central to anti-atheist prejudice.
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“…Bowles & Gintis, 2004; Bowles et al., 2003; Boyd & Richerson, 2002; Boyd et al., 2005; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis, 2000; Gintis et al., 2003; Henrich, 2004; Traulsen & Nowak, 2006 Gardner & West, 2004; Lehmann et al., 2007c Cooperation Bowles, 2006; Taylor & Nowak, 2007; Traulsen & Nowak,…”
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“These models permit within-group variation, and show that cultural group selection can operate even in the face of ample withingroup variation (Boyd and Richerson 2002; Henrich 2004; Boyd et al. 2003).,There are several reasons for this but three important ones revolve around: (1) the non-vertical nature of cultural i…”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe Origins and Psychology of Human Cooperation
Henrich, J., & Muthukrishna, M. (2021) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-081920-042106 · Cited by 457 · see citing works
“First, such critiques often fail to appreciate that cultural evolutionary models involving intergroup competition usually solve the free-rider problem using purely withingroup selective processes (not ‘group selection’), such as those built on reputation, punishment and signaling (Boyd & Richerson 1990; Henrich 2004).”
BackgroundSelf-citationNormative foundations of human cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schurtenberger, I. (2018) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0385-5 · Cited by 434 · see citing works
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“Intergroup competition and prestige-biased imitation of more successful groups offer the mechanism (110).”
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Richerson, P. J., Boyd, R., & Henrich, J. (2010) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0914631107 · Cited by 393 · see citing works
“For example, group selection on cultural variation plausibly played a leading role in the evolution of genes underpinning our unusual social systems, including cooperative breeding and cooperation among distantly related individuals (1, 30).”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe emergence of human uniqueness: Characters underlying behavioral modernity
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“An additional puzzle arises in the face of cross-cultural data suggesting that individuals in some societies do not engage in costly punishment as much as those in Western industrialized societies (4, 5).”
BackgroundPunishment sustains large-scale cooperation in prestate warfare
Mathew, S., & Boyd, R. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · doi:10.1073/pnas.1105604108 · Cited by 377 · see citing works
“An alternate view is that humans have evolved to cooperate in ethnolinguistic groups (groups with shared cultural norms and language), comprising thousands of unrelated strangers, even without formal coercive institutions (12, 13).”
BackgroundThe firm as an interactor: firms as vehicles for habits and routines
Hodgson, G., & Knudsen, T. (2004) · Journal of Evolutionary Economics · doi:10.1007/s00191-004-0192-1 · Cited by 374 · see citing works
“11 Fisher (1930), Campbell (1965), Price (1970, 1972, 1995), Sober (1984), Hull (1980), Hull et al. (2001), Darden and Cain (1989), Sober and Wilson (1998), Frank (1998), Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998), Nanay (2002), Kerr and Godfrey-Smith (2002b), Henrich (2004).”
BackgroundWhy people prefer unequal societies
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“Our approach is different since our goal is to understand a more fundamental issue—do we find evidence that comparable subjects from modern developed societies that are characterized by large-scale cooperation but differ strongly with regard to historical and cultural values behave differently in games of cooperation?…”
Five Misunderstandings About Cultural Evolution
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (2008) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-008-9037-1 · Cited by 360 · see citing works
Self-citationGame theory and human evolution: A critique of some recent interpretations of experimental games
Hagen, E. H., & Hammerstein, P. (2006) · Theoretical Population Biology · doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2005.09.005 · Cited by 328 · see citing works
“Henrich (2004) makes several reasonable verbal arguments that strategic non-conformism would be difficult, and perhaps impossible, to evolve.”
BackgroundConformists and Mavericks: The Empirics of Frequency-Dependent Cultural Transmission
EFFERSON, C., LALIVE, R., RICHERSON, P., MCELREATH, R., & LUBELL, M. (2008) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.08.003 · Cited by 336 · see citing works
“Thus, in conjunction with the punishment of norm violations andtheimitationofsuccess,conformityplaysacriticalrolein the study of how prosocial tendencies could have evolved in humansviaculturalgroupselection(Boyd,Gintis,Bowles,& Richerson, 2003; Boyd & Richerson, 1982; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003, 2004; Fehr & Gaechter,…”
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“Living in large groups requires some degree of behavioral coordination and conformity (Henrich, 2003).”
BackgroundDelton, A. W., Krasnow, M. M., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · doi:10.1073/pnas.1102131108 · Cited by 310 · see citing works
War’s Enduring Effects on the Development of Egalitarian Motivations and In-Group Biases
Bauer, M., Cassar, A., Chytilová, J., & Henrich, J. (2014) · Psychology Science · doi:10.1177/0956797613493444 · Cited by 304 · see citing works
“, Henrich, J., Povinelli, D. J., Richardson, A. S., et al. (2005). Chimpanzees are indifferent to the welfare of unrelated group members.”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe burden of proof for a cultural group selection account
Richerson, P., Baldini, R., Bell, A., Demps, K., Frost, K., Hillis, V., Mathew, S., Newton, E. K., Naar, N., Newson, L., et al. (2014) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x15000047 · Cited by 301 · see citing works
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“See Henrich (2004) and Henrich and Boyd (2002).”
BackgroundKeltner, D., Kogan, A., Piff, P. K., & Saturn, S. R. (2014) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115054 · Cited by 298 · see citing works
“…fitness and reciprocal altruism, and proximal forces, including tit-for-tat, altruistic punishment, and status seeking (Axelrod 1984; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003; Hamilton 1964; Hardy & Van Vugt 2006; Henrich 2004; Nowak & Sigmund 2005; Rand et al. 2009; Sober & Wilson 1998; Trivers 1971, 1972).”
BackgroundThe puzzle of monogamous marriage
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. (2012) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2011.0290 · Cited by 295 · see citing works
Self-citationInnovation in the collective brain
Muthukrishna, M., & Henrich, J. (2016) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2015.0192 · Cited by 417 · see citing works
Self-citationEerkens, J., & Lipo, C. P. (2007) · Journal of Archaeological Research · doi:10.1007/s10814-007-9013-z · Cited by 278 · see citing works
“…Bentley et al. 2004; Boyd and Richerson 1985, 1987, 1995, 2002; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981, 1983; Eerkens and Lipo 2005; Hahn and Bentley 2003; Henrich 2001, 2004a; Henrich and Boyd 2002; Henrich and Gil-White 2001; Henrich and McElreath 2003; Lipo et al. 1997; McElreath et al. 2003; Shennan…”
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Samuelson, L. (2005) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/0022051053737816 · Cited by 274 · see citing works
“What might might be the evolutionary origins of such “prosocial” behavior? Henrich [114] offers an explanation based on cultural group selection.”
BackgroundWhat is specific about evolutionary economics?
Witt, U. (2008) · Journal of Evolutionary Economics · doi:10.1007/s00191-008-0107-7 · Cited by 271 · see citing works
“It thus differs from the “dual inheritance hypothesis” in anthropology (see Henrich 2004; Richerson and Boyd 2005).”
BackgroundThe approach of ecological economics
Gowdy, J., & Erickson, J. (2005) · Cambridge Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/cje/bei033 · Cited by 260 · see citing works
Not irrational but habitual: The importance of "behavioural lock-in" in energy consumption
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“that punishment of norm violation is altruistic in the biological sense (Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Boyd et al., 2003; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundCan second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?
Cinyabuguma, M. M., Page, T., & Putterman, L. (2006) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-9127-z · Cited by 246 · see citing works
“21 The argument is also presented in Henrich (2004) , which serves as the focus for 17 commentaries in a special issue (January, 2004, vol.”
BackgroundAnti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation
Rand, D. G., Armao IV, J. J., Nakamaru, M., & Ohtsuki, H. (2010) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.06.010 · Cited by 233 · see citing works
“Recent models of cultural evolution suggest that weak conformist transmission can stabilize punishment and hence promotes the evolution of cooperation (Henrich and Boyd, 2001; Henrich, 2004).”
Culture rather than genes provides greater scope for the evolution of large-scale human prosociality
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“Selection for altruism in such large groups, however, remains a controversial topic in part because it is not clear that enough between-group variation existed in human societies to make it an appreciable evolutionary force (15).”
BackgroundSocietal threat and cultural variation in the strength of social norms: An evolutionary basis
Roos, P., Gelfand, M., Nau, D., & Lun, J. (2015) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2015.01.003 · Cited by 232 · see citing works
“…cooperative behavior (e.g., Bowles, 2009; Nowak, 2006), our model is designed to capture a broad array of different types of threat and shows evolution toward strong cooperation or coordination norms without the requirement for group selection (Bowles, 2006; Henrich, 2004; Traulsen & Nowak, 2006).”
The cultural evolution of emergent group-level traits
Smaldino, P. E. (2014) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x13001544 · Cited by 211 · see citing works
Vonk, J., Brosnan, S., Silk, J., Henrich, J., Richardson, A. S., Lambeth, S., Schapiro, S., & Povinelli, D. (2008) · Animal Behaviour · doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2007.09.036 · Cited by 226 · see citing works
“This pattern of findings indicates that while chimpanzees’ behaviour is consistent with standard evolutionary models based on kinship and reciprocity, human cooperation and prosociality may require an emerging class of evolutionary models, rooted in the coevolutionary interaction of genes and culture (Boyd et al. 2003…”
BackgroundSelf-citationTrust and leadership in virtual teamwork: A media naturalness perspective
DeRosa, D. M., Hantula, D. A., Kock, N., & D'Arcy, J. (2004) · Human Resource Management · doi:10.1002/hrm.20016 · Cited by 220 · see citing works
“And, to the extent that groups of individuals may be selected for or selected against culturally, if stable and identifiable subgroups or cultures of people are not prepared to enter a world of virtual work, relatively rapid within-group evolutionary processes will quickly favor those individuals with these new virtua…”
BackgroundChildren develop a veil of fairness.
Shaw, A., Montinari, N., Piovesan, M., Olson, K., Gino, F., & Norton, M. (2014) · Journal of experimental psychology. General · doi:10.1037/a0031247 · Cited by 213 · see citing works
“Concerns with fairness appear in nearly every culture in the world, even in small hunter-gatherer societies (Boehm, 2008; Gurven, 2004; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundTurner, R., Morse-Jones, S., & Fisher, B. (2010) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.05280.x · Cited by 211 · see citing works
Evolutionary theorizing and modeling of sustainability transitions
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“However, engagement in reciprocity, particularly in the complexly cooperative social environments of human beings, requires specially designed social-cognitive abilities that are uniquely sophisticated in humans (Tooby and Cosmides, 1996; Hammerstein, 2002; Frontiers in Human Neuroscience…”
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“Good predictions can be made, however, using models of biased cultural transmission (Henrich 2004).”
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Regular rates of popular culture change reflect random copying
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“…strategy, as copying can tend toward baseless decisions, whereas independent decision making may lead to a rational, collective b wisdom Q of a group (Surowiecki, 2004) and/or optimal solutions through a process analogous to natural selection (e.g., Crow & Aoki, 1982a, 1982b, 1984; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundDong, B., Dulleck, U., & Torgler, B. (2009) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2011.12.001 · Cited by 172 · see citing works
“Alternatively, the concept of conformity (Henrich, 2004) has been used to explain conditional cooperation.”
BackgroundCurtis, V. (2011) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2011.0165 · Cited by 167 · see citing works
The Big Man Mechanism: how prestige fosters cooperation and creates prosocial leaders
Henrich, J., Chudek, M., & Boyd, R. (2015) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2015.0013 · Cited by 163 · see citing works
Self-citationDemography and ecology drive variation in cooperation across human populations
Lamba, S., & Mace, R. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · doi:10.1073/pnas.1105186108 · Cited by 161 · see citing works
“This behavioral variation is attributed to culturally inherited cooperative norms and taken as support for cultural group selection models of large-scale cooperation (1, 2, 7).”
BackgroundPutterman, L. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1189969 · Cited by 160
Culture, evolution and the puzzle of human cooperation
Henrich, J., & Henrich, N. (2006) · Cognitive Systems Research · doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2005.11.010 · Cited by 156 · see citing works
“As discussed below, this interaction may be critical for understanding some aspects of human cooperation, particularly largescale cooperation among non-relatives (Baldwin, 1896a; Boyd & Richerson, 2002b; Durham, 1991; Henrich, 2004; Richerson & Boyd, 1998, 2000).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationTowards a Socio-Cognitive Approach to Knowledge Transfer
Ringberg, T., & Reihlen, M. R. (2008) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00757.x · Cited by 150 · see citing works
Evolutionary thinking in environmental economics
van den Bergh, J. (2007) · Journal of Evolutionary Economics · doi:10.1007/s00191-006-0054-0 · Cited by 150 · see citing works
“26 psychology and experimental economics, as well as of group selection theory (Bergstrom, 2002; Henrich, 2004).”
Division of Labor, Economic Specialization, and the Evolution of Social Stratification
Henrich, J., & Boyd, R. (2008) · Current Anthropology · doi:10.1086/587889 · Cited by 148 · see citing works
“The existence of different societies at stable equilibria with different total payoffs creates the conditions for cultural group selection (Henrich 2004a).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationAllen-Arave, W., Gurven, M., & Hill, K. (2008) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.03.002 · Cited by 147 · see citing works
“…of the " needy " may be a cooperative behavior backed by third party punishment (Hill and Gurven 2004), we must consider the possibility that this cultural convention has evolved through cultural group selection (see Bowles 2006; Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson, 2003; and Henrich 2004 ).”
Collective Action in Action: Prosocial Behavior in and out of the Laboratory
Gurven, M., & Winking, J. W. (2008) · American Anthropologist · doi:10.1111/j.1548-1433.2008.00024.x · Cited by 146 · see citing works
Much of the ‘economics of property rights’ devalues property and legal rights
Hodgson, G. (2015) · Journal of Institutional Economics · doi:10.1017/s1744137414000630 · Cited by 145 · see citing works
“This evolutionary argument is supported by evidence from primates (De Waal, 1996, 2006) and modern evolutionary theory with a careful rehabilitation of the concept of group selection (Henrich, 2004, Hodgson, 2013a, 2014; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010; Sober and Wilson, 1998).”
ResultCompetition Between Organizational Groups: Its Impact on Altruistic and Antisocial Motivations
Goette, L., Huffman, D., Meier, S., & Sutter, M. (2012) · Management Sciences · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1466 · Cited by 143 · see citing works
“These altruistic behaviors can survive because they enhance group fitness, and make groups composed of altruists more likely to survive environmental shocks (Henrich, 2004; Boyd et al., 2003).”
BackgroundMethodCan sustainable consumption be learned? A model of cultural evolution
Buenstorf, G., & Cordes, C. (2008) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.01.028 · Cited by 125 · see citing works
Language as an emergent group-level trait
Panchanathan, K., Mathew, S., & Perreault, C. (2014) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x13002860 · Cited by 142 · see citing works
What Motivates Common Pool Resource Users? Experimental Evidence from the FieldPreprint
Vélez, M., Stranlund, J., & Murphy, J. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.701262 · Cited by 141 · see citing works
“3 Our concept of conformity is similar to the notion of normative conformity used in cultural evolutionary models and the social learning literature (see Henrich and Boyd, 2001; Henrich, 2004; McElreath et al., 2005).”
Kock, N. (2009) · MIS Q. · doi:10.2307/20650297 · Cited by 139 · see citing works
“In cultural evolution, for example, units of cultural transmission, sometimes called memes, are hypothesized to be copied through imitation by individuals until they spread to a large number of individuals of a cultural group (Blackmore 1999, 2001; Dawkins 1990; Henrich 2004).”
BackgroundThe influence of cultural framing on play in the trust game: A maasai example
Cronk, L. (2007) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.05.006 · Cited by 136 · see citing works
“This may, in turn, contribute to a theoretically predicted (Boyd & Richerson, 2002; Henrich, 2004) and empirically observed (Henrich, et al., 2004; Henrich, et al., 2006) pattern in which learning dynamics generates equilibria in beliefs about norms of social interaction that are stable and widely…”
BackgroundAn evolutionary anthropological perspective on modern human origins.
Marean, C. W. (2015) · Annual Review of Anthropology · doi:10.1146/annurev-anthro-102313-025954 · Cited by 135 · see citing works
“…have deep-seated non-selfish preferences that are unique among living animals (Bowles & Gintis 2011, Fehr & Fischbacher 2003, Fehr & Gächter 2002, Henrich 2004, Henrich et al 2001, Henrich & Henrich 2006) while varying by cultural context (Henrich et al 2010, Henrich & Henrich 2006, House et al…”
BackgroundLimits to CBA in UK and European environmental policy: retrospects and future prospects
Turner, R. (2007) · doi:10.1007/s10640-007-9119-2 · Cited by 135
Coming and going: Experiments on endogenous group sizes for excludable public goods
Ahn, T., Isaac, R., & Salmon, T. (2009) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.06.007 · Cited by 134 · see citing works
Smith, K. M., Larroucau, T., Mabulla, I. A., & Apicella, C. L. (2018) · bioRxiv · doi:10.1101/313064 · Cited by 132
Public goods in relation to competition, cooperation, and spite
Levin, S. A. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1400830111 · Cited by 115 · see citing works
“Such devices will give groups integrities that make collective action and collective benefits possible, and make cultural group selection feasible (91, 92).”
BackgroundRapid cultural adaptation can facilitate the evolution of large-scale cooperation
Boyd, R., Richerson, P., & Henrich, J. (2010) · Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1007/s00265-010-1100-3 · Cited by 131 · see citing works
“Summaries and further references can be found in Richerson and Boyd (2005), Boyd and Richerson (2009), Henrich (2004, 2008), and Henrich and Henrich (2007).”
BackgroundSelf-citationEvolutionary causes and consequences of consistent individual variation in cooperative behaviour
Bergmüller, R., Schürch, R., & Hamilton, I. (2010) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0124 · Cited by 129 · see citing works
“Hence, cooperative personalities or individual differences in cooperative type have been almost entirely neglected in research on the evolution and stability of cooperation (Axelrod 1984; Trivers 1985; Alexander 1987; Dugatkin 1997; Hammerstein 2003; Henrich 2004; van Schaik & Kappeler 2006; Henrich & Henrich 2007), t…”
Can Game(s) Theory Explain Culture?
Bednar, J., & Page, S. (2007) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463107075108 · Cited by 129 · see citing works
- Authors
- Henrich, J.
- Affiliations
- Emory University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Henrich, Joseph
- ORCID
- Henrich, Joseph
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2004-01
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3-35
- ISSN
- 0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2167287869
- Cited by
- 1,096
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 26 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 45 · 2023: 62 · 2022: 66 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 65 · 2019: 45 · 2018: 55 · 2017: 62 · 2016: 57 · 2015: 55 · 2014: 49 · 2013: 63 · 2012: 52
- FWCI
- 104.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- cultural group selection, prosocial behavior, altruism, altruistic punishment, cultural evolution, equilibrium selection, cultural learning, imitation learning, large-scale cooperation
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