Bounded Rationality in Taking Risks and Drawing Inferences
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This commentary provides a discussion of the concept of `bounded rationality' as it applies to the theses advanced by Lopes (1991) and Evans (1991). Lopes's (1991) assessment of the irrationalist consequences of Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) work on heuristics and biases is premature because bounded rationality implies that people could not employ optimal strategies. Considerations of bounded rationality also provide additional criteria by which to judge the theories of deductive reasoning discussed by Evans (1991). Judged by this criterion, theories whose goal is to explain logically competent performance are inadequate (Oaksford & Chater, 1991). Thus Evans's assessment of the state of current theories of reasoning requires revision.
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Citations
Cites
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
(1982) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477 · Cited by 8,240
On the psychology of prediction.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0034747 · Cited by 6,202
Belief in the law of small numbers.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1971) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/h0031322 · Cited by 3,246
Cited by
A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection.
Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (1994) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037//0033-295x.101.4.608 · Cited by 1,052
Self-citationShastri, L., & Ajjanagadde, V. (1993) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00030910 · Cited by 634
The Search for Simplicity: A Fundamental Cognitive Principle?
Chater, N. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A · doi:10.1080/027249899391070 · Cited by 327
Self-citationThe Probability Heuristics Model of Syllogistic Reasoning
Chater, N., & Oaksford, M. (1999) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1006/cogp.1998.0696 · Cited by 324
Self-citationThe probabilistic approach to human reasoning
Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (2001) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(00)01699-5 · Cited by 271
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Metadata
- Authors
- Oaksford, M., & Chater, N.
- Venue
- Theory & Psychology
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1992-05
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 225-230
- ISSN
- 0959-3543 (ISSN-L)
- 1461-7447
- OpenAlex
- W2151934017
- Cited by
- 105
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 21.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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