A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection.

Abstract

Human reasoning in hypothesis-testing tasks like Wason's (1966, 1968) selection task has been depicted as prone to systematic biases. However, performance on this task has been assessed against a now outmoded falsificationist philosophy of science. Therefore, the experimental data is reassessed in the light of a Bayesian model of optimal data selection in inductive hypothesis testing. The model provides a rational analysis (Anderson, 1990) of the selection task that fits well with people's performance on both abstract and thematic versions of the task. The model suggests that reasoning in these tasks may be rational rather than subject to systematic bias. Over the past 30 years, results in the psychology of reasoning have raised doubts about human rationality. The assumption of human rationality has a long history. Aristotle took the capacity for rational thought to be the defining characteristic of human beings, the capacity that separated us from the animals. Descartes regarded the ability to use language and to reason as the hallmarks of the mental that separated it from the merely physical. Many contemporary philosophers of mind also appeal to a basic principle of rationality in accounting for everyday, folk psychological explanation whereby we explain each other's behavior in terms of our beliefs and desires (Cherniak, 1986; Cohen, 1981; Davidson, 1984; Dennett, 1987; but see Stich, 1990). These philosophers, both ancient and modern, share a common view of rationality: To be rational is to reason according to rules (Brown, 1989). Logic and mathematics provide the normative rules that tell us how we should reason. Rationality therefore seems to demand that the human cognitive system embodies the rules of logic and mathematics. However, results in the psychology of reasoning appear to show that people do not reason according to these rules. In both deductive (Evans, 1982, 1989;

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