Logic, Fast and Slow: Advances in Dual-Process Theorizing
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Studies on human reasoning have long established that intuitions can bias inference and lead to violations of logical norms. Popular dual-process models, which characterize thinking as an interaction between intuitive (System 1) and deliberate (System 2) thought processes, have presented an appealing explanation for this observation. According to this account, logical reasoning is traditionally considered as a prototypical example of a task that requires effortful deliberate thinking. In recent years, however, a number of findings obtained with new experimental paradigms have brought into question the traditional dual-process characterization. A key observation is that people can process logical principles in classic reasoning tasks intuitively and without deliberation. We review the paradigms and sketch how this work is leading to the development of revised dual-process models.
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Citations
Cites
Shiffrin, R. M., & Schneider, W. (1977) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.84.2.127 · Cited by 7,335
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 · Cited by 5,137
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612460685 · Cited by 4,271
Spontaneous giving and calculated greed
Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D., & Nowak, M. A. (2012) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature11467 · Cited by 1,334 · cited 1×
“This led to dual-process models of, for example, prosocial cooperation (Rand et al., 2012) and moral reasoning (Greene, 2015) that became highly influential in their own right.”
BackgroundMiserliness in human cognition: the interaction of detection, override and mindware
Stanovich, K. E. (2018) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546783.2018.1459314 · Cited by 279 · cited 1×
“It is possible that this group has not managed to automatize the application of the necessary logical knowledge (Stanovich, 2018).”
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Cited by
The Bias That Divides Us: The Science and Politics of Myside Thinking
Stanovich, K. E. (2021) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/13367.001.0001 · Cited by 152
Sharma, K., Zhan, X., Nah, F. F.-H., Siau, K., & Cheng, M. X. (2021) · Organizational Cybersecurity Journal: Practice, Process and People · doi:10.1108/ocj-03-2021-0009 · Cited by 25
Corser, R., Voss, R. P., & Jasper, J. D. (2024) · Journal of Numerical Cognition · doi:10.5964/jnc.12473 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- De Neys, W., & Pennycook, G.
- Venue
- Current Directions in Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2019-08-07
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 503-509
- ISSN
- 0963-7214 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8721
- OpenAlex
- W2965931042
- Cited by
- 248
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 23.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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