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Cited by 4Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsCognitive and developmental aspects of mathematical skillsClinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills

Do errors on classic decision biases happen fast or slow? Numeracy and decision time predict probability matching, sample size neglect, and ratio bias

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Corser, Ryan, Voss, Raymond P., Jasper, John D.·2024·Journal of Numerical Cognition
DOI 10.5964/jnc.12473
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Abstract

Higher numeracy is associated with better comprehension and use of numeric information as well as reduced susceptibility to some decision biases. We extended this line of work by showing that increased numeracy predicted probability maximizing (versus matching) as well as a better appreciation of large sample sizes. At the same time, we replicated the findings that the more numerate were less susceptible to the ratio bias and base rate neglect phenomena. Decision time predicted accuracy for the ratio bias, probability matching, and sample size scenarios, but not the base rate scenarios. Interestingly, this relationship between decision time and accuracy was positive for the ratio bias problems, but negative for the probability matching and sample size scenarios. Implications for research on cognitive ability and decision biases are discussed.

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  • Greater numeracy predicts a preference for maximizing over matching and over other suboptimal strategies.

    “A preference for maximizing over matching (and over other suboptimal strategies) is predicted by greater numeracy (Corser et al., 2024)”

    From Probability matching and statistical naïveté (2025) · cites this paper as Corser et al., 2024

  • The proposed mechanism of statistical naïveté may relate to numeracy, which impacts many judgment and decision-making tasks including probability matching.

    “This proposed mechanism may relate to numeracy, which impacts many judgment and decision-making tasks (e.g., ratio bias, denominator neglect, framing effects, gambler's fallacy; e.g., Peters et al., 2006), including probability matching (Corser et al., 2024).”

    From Probability matching and statistical naïveté (2025) · cites this paper as Corser et al., 2024

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Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Corser, R., Voss, R. P., & Jasper, J. D.
Affiliations
  • Vanderbilt University (US)
  • Purdue University Fort Wayne (US)
  • University of Toledo (US)
ORCID
Venue
Journal of Numerical Cognition
Publisher
Leibniz Institute for Psychology (ZPID)
Published
2024-11-04
Volume
10
ISSN
2363-8761 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.5964/jnc.12473
OpenAlex
W4404046960
Cited by
4
References
2
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 2
FWCI
1.28
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Journal of Numerical Cognition (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
  • PsychOpen Gold (Leibniz Institute for Psychology) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Psychology Archives (cc-by)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Cognitive and developmental aspects of mathematical skills
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
Keywords
numeracy, decision bias, probability matching, ratio bias, base rate neglect, decision time, reaction time (psychology), probability maximization, cognitive ability

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