The Strength of Strong Ties: A Model of Contact-Making in Policy Networks with Evidence from U.S. Health Politics
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Interest groups establish contacts with each other as a way of gaining useful policy information, and in this article we develop and test a model to explain this political phenomenon. Our simulation model suggests that when few need information, groups will pursue an acquaintance strategy by investing time and resources in gaining `weak tie' political acquaintances rather than in gaining `strong tie' political friends, but that as the collective demand for information rises, groups increasingly follow a chum strategy , placing greater emphasis on establishing strong ties. We test these hypotheses in an analysis of inter-organizational contact-making in U.S. health politics, using the data of Laumann and Knoke (1987), with OLS regressions of average group contacts over lobbying events over time and maximum likelihood count models of contacts across interest groups. Both analyses show that as collective demand for information increases, interest groups place greater priority on establishing strong ties, even while controlling for organizational attributes such as budget, mobilization capacity and organization age. The results suggest some conditions where policy networks in the aggregate are less likely to distribute information efficiently, and, in particular, that policy networks are less efficient at distributing information when information is most in demand.
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Cites
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Cited by
Social Capital, Networks, and Knowledge Transfer
Inkpen, A. C., & Tsang, E. W. K. (2005) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2005.15281445 · Cited by 3,864
COLLINS, C. J., & CLARK, K. D. (2003) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/30040665 · Cited by 1,358
Smith, K. G., Collins, C. J., & Clark, K. D. (2005) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2005.16928421 · Cited by 1,336
Kang, S.-C., Morris, S. S., & Snell, S. A. (2007) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2007.23464060 · Cited by 802
Industrial dynamics and managerial networking in an emerging market: the case of China
Luo, Y. (2003) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.363 · Cited by 561
Metadata
- Authors
- Carpenter, D., Esterling, K., & Lazer, D.
- Venue
- Rationality and Society
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2003-11
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 411-440
- ISSN
- 1043-4631 (ISSN-L)
- 1461-7358
- OpenAlex
- W2110082158
- Cited by
- 226
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 33.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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