The Origins of Democracy in England
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article uses a rational choice model of the origins of democracy to analyze the political history of medieval England from the Norman conquest to the Hundred Years War. Why did a country just taken over by a ruler more autocratic than his predecessors develop a political system increasingly dominated by the rule of law and protodemocratic institutions? The authors argue that protodemocratic institutions such as the Magna Carta, Parliament, and an independent judiciary evolved as unintended consequences of the self-interested wealth-maximizing behavior of rulers and some of their subjects. The evolution of contractual relations between rulers and nobles, towns, and Jewish financiers is shown to be consistent with the theory. The article concludes with a discussion of why the rule of law was more secure and protodemocratic institutions were stronger and more enduring in England than in Continental monarchies.
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Cites
North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1989) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050700009451 · Cited by 5,300
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653
Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule
Bendix, R. (1978) · doi:10.1525/9780520351950 · Cited by 446
Cities and states in Europe, 1000?1800
Tilly, C. (1989) · Theory and Society · doi:10.1007/bf00149492 · Cited by 76
Cited by
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510809 · Cited by 4,810
Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development
Olson, M. (1993) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2938736 · Cited by 3,794
The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force
McGuire, M. C., & Olson, M. (1998) · The Political Dimension of Economic Growth · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-26284-7_3 · Cited by 1,002
Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries: Capacity and Consent
(2008) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511490897 · Cited by 581
Why we need a new theory of government
Levi, M. (2006) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592706060038 · Cited by 149
Metadata
- Authors
- KISER, E., & BARZEL, Y.
- Venue
- Rationality and Society
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1991-10
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 396-422
- ISSN
- 1043-4631 (ISSN-L)
- 1461-7358
- OpenAlex
- W2112197405
- Cited by
- 111
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 4.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- KISER, E., & BARZEL, Y. (1991). The Origins of Democracy in England. Rationality and Society. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463191003004002
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.