The DOI matches its Crossref record; 84 of the 84 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats
Open accessAbstract
Corporate scandals, reflected in excessive management compensation and fraudulent accounts, cause great damage. Agency theory’s insistence to link the compensation of managers and directors as closely as possible to firm performance is a major reason for these scandals. They cannot be overcome by improving variable pay for performance as selfish extrinsic motivation is reinforced. Based on the common pool approach to the firm, institutions are proposed, serving to raise intrinsically motivated corporate virtue. More importance is to be attributed to fixed pay and strengthening the legitimacy of authorities by procedural fairness, relational contracts, and organizational citizenship behavior.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The "what" and "why" of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1207/s15327965pli1104_01 · Cited by 34,210
Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in Human Behavior
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985) · doi:10.1007/978-1-4899-2271-7 · Cited by 26,772
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
The Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of Innovation
Nonaka, I., & Takeuchi, H. (1995) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195092691.001.0001 · Cited by 18,010
Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm
Grant, R. M. (1996) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250171110 · Cited by 16,157
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
JENSEN, M. C. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x · Cited by 8,528
Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. (1999) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.125.6.627 · Cited by 7,176 · cited 3×
“Deci et al. (1999) conducted an extensive study to show that these conclusions were unwarranted and that the crowding-out effect is a robust phenomenon under specified conditions.”
InfluentialToward a Stewardship Theory of Management
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., & Donaldson, L. (1997) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/259223 · Cited by 5,316
Tyler, T. R. (2006) · doi:10.1515/9781400828609 · Cited by 5,156
An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining
Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(82)90011-7 · Cited by 4,816
Cited by
Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives jointly predict performance: A 40-year meta-analysis.
Cerasoli, C. P., Nicklin, J. M., & Ford, M. T. (2014) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0035661 · Cited by 1,981
Perry, J. L., Hondeghem, A., & Wise, L. R. (2010) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02196.x · Cited by 983
CALCULATING TRAGEDY: ASSESSING THE COSTS OF TERRORISM
Frey, B. S., Luechinger, S., & Stutzer, A. (2007) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6419.2007.00505.x · Cited by 439
Self-citationBack to the Future? Performance‐Related Pay, Empirical Research, and the Perils of Persistence
Perry, J. L., Engbers, T. A., & Jun, S. Y. (2009) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2008.01939_2.x · Cited by 388
Paarlberg, L. E., & Lavigna, B. (2010) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02199.x · Cited by 380
Metadata
- Authors
- Frey, B. S., & Osterloh, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Management Inquiry
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2005-03
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 96-111
- ISSN
- 1056-4926 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-6542
- OpenAlex
- W3122451583
- Cited by
- 274
- References
- 84
- FWCI
- 94.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/1056492604273757
- The paper
- Frey, B. S., & Osterloh, M. (2005). Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats. Journal of Management Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1177/1056492604273757
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.