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Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats
Open accessAbstract
Corporate scandals, reflected in excessive management compensation and fraudulent accounts, cause great damage. Agency theory’s insistence to link the compensation of managers and directors as closely as possible to firm performance is a major reason for these scandals. They cannot be overcome by improving variable pay for performance as selfish extrinsic motivation is reinforced. Based on the common pool approach to the firm, institutions are proposed, serving to raise intrinsically motivated corporate virtue. More importance is to be attributed to fixed pay and strengthening the legitimacy of authorities by procedural fairness, relational contracts, and organizational citizenship behavior.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Frey, B. S., & Osterloh, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Management Inquiry
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2005-03
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 96-111
- ISSN
- 1056-4926 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-6542
- OpenAlex
- W3122451583
- Cited by
- 274
- References
- 85
- FWCI
- 94.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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