The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A tale of two densities: active inference is enactive inference
Open accessAbstract
The aim of this article is to clarify how best to interpret some of the central constructs that underwrite the free-energy principle (FEP) – and its corollary, active inference – in theoretical neuroscience and biology: namely, the role that generative models and variational densities play in this theory. We argue that these constructs have been systematically misrepresented in the literature, because of the conflation between the FEP and active inference, on the one hand, and distinct (albeit closely related) Bayesian formulations, centred on the brain – variously known as predictive processing, predictive coding or the prediction error minimisation framework. More specifically, we examine two contrasting interpretations of these models: a structural representationalist interpretation and an enactive interpretation. We argue that the structural representationalist interpretation of generative and recognition models does not do justice to the role that these constructs play in active inference under the FEP. We propose an enactive interpretation of active inference – what might be called enactive inference. In active inference under the FEP, the generative and recognition models are best cast as realising inference and control – the self-organising, belief-guided selection of action policies – and do not have the properties ascribed by structural representationalists.
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Cites
The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?
Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120 · cited 15×
“Indeed, this evaluation, which involves computing the marginal likelihood or evidence P(o), often turns out to be an intractable problem (Friston, 2010; Kiefer & Hohwy, 2018).”
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Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924 · cited 1×
“…on the one hand, and distinct (albeit closely related) Bayesian formulations, centred on the brain – variously known as predictive processing (Clark, 2013, 2015; Metzinger & Wiese, 2017), predictive coding (Rao & Ballard, 1999) or the prediction error minimisation (PEM) framework (Kiefer &…”
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“This optimisation can proceed explicitly as in predictive coding (Rao & Ballard, 1999), belief propagation (Pearl, 1982) and (marginal) neuronal message passing (Parr, Markovic, Kiebel, & Friston, 2019) – depending upon the form of the general model and optimisation scheme.”
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Hierarchical Bayesian inference in the visual cortex
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“The various flavours of Bayesian cognitive science – for example, the Bayesian brain (Knill & Pouget, 2004), predictive coding (Rao & Ballard, 1999) and active inference (Friston, 2010) – furnish mathematical tools to model how organisms engage with their worlds (Lee & Mumford, 2003; Mumford, 1992).”
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Self-citationActive inference: a process theory
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Cited by
Hierarchical dynamics as a macroscopic organizing principle of the human brain
Raut, R. V., Snyder, A. Z., & Raichle, M. E. (2020) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2003383117 · Cited by 307
Interoception as modeling, allostasis as control
Sennesh, E., Theriault, J., Brooks, D., van de Meent, J.-W., Barrett, L. F., & Quigley, K. S. (2022) · Biological Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2021.108242 · Cited by 107
The first prior: From co-embodiment to co-homeostasis in early life
Ciaunica, A., Constant, A., Preissl, H., & Fotopoulou, K. (2021) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2021.103117 · Cited by 105
Predictive processing in cognitive robotics: A review
Ciria, A., Schillaci, G., Pezzulo, G., Hafner, V. V., & Lara, B. (2021) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_01383 · Cited by 51
“Bayesian beliefs are treated as inferences about the posterior probability distribution (recognition density) via a process of belief updating (Ramstead et al., 2020).”
BackgroundNeural and phenotypic representation under the free-energy principle
Ramstead, M. J. D., Hesp, C., Tschantz, A., Smith, R., Constant, A., & Friston, K. (2021) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.11.024 · Cited by 43
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ramstead, M. J., Kirchhoff, M. D., & Friston, K. J.
- Venue
- Adaptive Behavior
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2019-07-21
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 225-239
- ISSN
- 1059-7123 (ISSN-L)
- 1741-2633
- OpenAlex
- W2953421850
- Cited by
- 220
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 15.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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