The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Party Polarization and Legislative Gridlock
Abstract
This article investigates how parties affect legislative gridlock-the inability of government to enact significant proposals on the policy agenda. Conventional accounts suggest that divided party control of govemment causes such stalemate. I offer an alternative partisan model of gridlock that incorporates party polarization, party seat division, and the interaction between these two factors. Using an original data set of major legislative proposals considered between 1975 and 1994, I find that divided govemment does not affect gridlock once party polarization and party seat division are taken into account. Instead, I find that higher party polarization increases the likelihood of encountering gridlock on a given proposal, but that the magnitude of this increase diminishes to the extent that a party is close to having enough seats to thwart filibusters and vetoes.
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Cites
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The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947–96
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Cited by
Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work
Giné, V. L., & Tsebelis, G. (2003) · Reis · doi:10.2307/40184562 · Cited by 3,359
PARTY POLARIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences
Layman, G. C., Carsey, T. M., & Horowitz, J. M. (2006) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.070204.105138 · Cited by 827
The role of (social) media in political polarization: A systematic review
Kubin, E., & von Sikorski, C. (2021) · Annals of the International Communication Association · doi:10.1080/23808985.2021.1976070 · Cited by 610
“However, political polarization can also be bad for democracy, increasing the centralization of power (Lee, 2015), congressional gridlock (Jones, 2001), and making citizens less satisfied (Wagner, 2021).”
BackgroundCongress and the Politics of Problem Solving
Adler, E. S., & Wilkerson, J. D. (2013) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139150842 · Cited by 280
Interventions to reduce partisan animosity
Hartman, R., Blakey, W., Womick, J., Bail, C., Finkel, E. J., Han, H., Sarrouf, J., Schroeder, J., Sheeran, P., Van Bavel, J. J., et al. (2022) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-022-01442-3 · Cited by 171
Metadata
- Authors
- Jones, D. R.
- Venue
- Political Research Quarterly
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2001-03
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 125-141
- ISSN
- 1065-9129 (ISSN-L)
- 1938-274X
- OpenAlex
- W1996844791
- Cited by
- 262
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 3.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.