The Merit of Meritocratization: Politics, Bureaucracy, and the Institutional Deterrents of Corruption
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Comparative studies of corruption focus on the selection and incentives of policymakers. With few exceptions, actors who are in charge of implementing policies have been neglected. This article analyzes an original data set on the bureaucratic features and its effects on corruption in fifty-two countries. Two empirical findings challenge the conventional wisdom in literature. First, certain bureaucratic factors, particularly meritocratic recruitment, reduce corruption, even when controlling for a large set of alternative explanations. Second, the analysis shows that other allegedly relevant bureaucratic factors, such as public employees’ competitive salaries, career stability, or internal promotion, do not have a significant impact.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Dahlström, C., Lapuente, V., & Teorell, J.
- Venue
- Political Research Quarterly
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2011-06-16
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 656-668
- ISSN
- 1065-9129 (ISSN-L)
- 1938-274X
- OpenAlex
- W1981932895
- Cited by
- 509
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 47.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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