The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task
Open accessAbstract
This paper investigates the normative criteria that guide the allocation of a policy task to an elected politician versus an independent bureaucrat. The bureaucrat is preferable for technical tasks for which ability is more important than effort, or if there is great uncertainty about whether the policymaker has the required abilities. The optimal allocation of redistributive tasks is ambiguous, and depends on how the bureaucrat can be instructed. But irrespective of the normative conclusion, the politician prefers not to delegate redistributive policies. (JEL D72, D73, D82)
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Cites
Bureaucracy: what government agencies do and why they do it
(1990) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.27-4796 · Cited by 3,795
Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy
Bucovetsky, S., Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2002) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061733 · Cited by 3,748
Self-citationThe Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Rogoff, K. (1985) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885679 · Cited by 3,688
Incumbent performance and electoral control
Ferejohn, J. (1986) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00124924 · Cited by 2,161
Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents
Besley, T., & Ghatak, M. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054201413 · Cited by 1,389
Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-6536 · Cited by 910
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
Maskin, E., & Tirole, J. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828042002606 · Cited by 904
Carpenter, D. (2002) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691214078 · Cited by 798
The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures
Dewatripont, M., Jewitt, I., & Tirole, J. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00084 · Cited by 580
Dewatripont, M., Jewitt, I., & Tirole, J. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00085 · Cited by 575
Cited by
Chen, Y. J., Li, P., & Lu, Y. (2018) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.02.001 · Cited by 678
Bureaucrats or politicians? Part II: Multiple policy tasks
Alesina, A., & Tabellini, G. (2008) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.06.004 · Cited by 334
Self-citationA political-economic model of police administration
Clark, T. S. (2024) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/729933 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- Alesina, A., & Tabellini, G.
- Venue
- The American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2007-03-01
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 169-179
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2065190337
- Cited by
- 548
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 60.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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