Psychological Essentialism, Implicit Theories, and Intergroup Relations
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Research on implicit person theories shows that beliefs about the malleability of human attributes have important implications for social cognition, interpersonal behavior, and intergroup relations. We argue that these implications can be understood within the framework of psychological essentialism, which extends work on implicit theories in promising directions. We review evidence that immutability beliefs covary with a broader set of essentialist beliefs, and that these essentialist beliefs are associated with stereotyping and prejudice. We then present recent studies indicating that associations between implicit person theories and stereotyping may be explained in terms of essentialist beliefs, implying a significant role for these beliefs in the psychology of group perception. Finally, we propose ways in which research and theory on essentialist beliefs might clarify and advance research on implicit person theories.
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Citations
Cites
Individual differences in need for cognitive closure.
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Concepts, Kinds, and Cognitive Development
Keil, F. C. (1989) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2065.001.0001 · Cited by 1,886
Comments on Part I: Psychological essentialism
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Leyens, J., Rodriguez‐Perez, A., Rodriguez‐Torres, R., Gaunt, R., Paladino, M., Vaes, J., & Demoulin, S. (2001) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.50 · Cited by 622
(2003) · Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development · doi:10.1111/1540-5834.00246 · Cited by 522
Emotional prejudice, essentialism, and nationalism The 2002 Tajfel lecture
Leyens, J., Cortes, B., Demoulin, S., Dovidio, J. F., Fiske, S. T., Gaunt, R., Paladino, M., Rodriguez‐Perez, A., Rodriguez‐Torres, R., & Vaes, J. (2003) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.170 · Cited by 314
Cited by
Genetic essentialism: On the deceptive determinism of DNA.
Dar-Nimrod, I., & Heine, S. J. (2011) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0021860 · Cited by 745
Biological conceptions of race and the motivation to cross racial boundaries.
Williams, M. J., & Eberhardt, J. L. (2008) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.6.1033 · Cited by 461
Religion in the Face of Uncertainty: An Uncertainty-Identity Theory Account of Religiousness
Hogg, M. A., Adelman, J. R., & Blagg, R. D. (2010) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868309349692 · Cited by 443
Pehrson, S., Brown, R., & Zagefka, H. (2009) · British Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1348/014466608x288827 · Cited by 316
Donovan, B. M., Stuhlsatz, M. A. M., Edelson, D. C., & Buck Bracey, Z. E. (2019) · Science Education · doi:10.1002/sce.21502 · Cited by 60
“is innate and beliefs about innate potential are one component of essentialist thinking (Haslam et al., 2006; Haslam et al., 2000; Rattan, Savani, Naidu, & Dweck, 2012).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Haslam, N., Bastian, B., Bain, P., & Kashima, Y.
- Venue
- Group Processes & Intergroup Relations
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2006-01
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 63-76
- ISSN
- 1368-4302 (ISSN-L)
- 1461-7188
- OpenAlex
- W2092683252
- Cited by
- 227
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 25.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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