People believe misinformation is a threat because they assume others are gullible
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Alarmist narratives about the flow of misinformation and its negative consequences have gained traction in recent years. If these fears are to some extent warranted, the scientific literature suggests that many of them are exaggerated. Why are people so worried about misinformation? In two pre-registered surveys conducted in the United Kingdom ( N study_1 = 300, N study_2 = 300) and replicated in the United States ( N study_1 = 302, N study_2 = 299), we investigated the psychological factors associated with perceived danger of misinformation and how it contributes to the popularity of alarmist narratives on misinformation. We find that the strongest, and most reliable, predictor of perceived danger of misinformation is the third-person effect (i.e. the perception that others are more vulnerable to misinformation than the self) and, in particular, the belief that “distant” others (as opposed to family and friends) are vulnerable to misinformation. The belief that societal problems have simple solutions and clear causes was consistently, but weakly, associated with perceived danger of online misinformation. Other factors, like negative attitudes toward new technologies and higher sensitivity to threats, were inconsistently, and weakly, associated with perceived danger of online misinformation. Finally, we found that participants who report being more worried about misinformation are more willing to like and share alarmist narratives on misinformation. Our findings suggest that fears about misinformation tap into our tendency to view other people as gullible.
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Citations
Cites
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“Second, people generally distrust hyperpartisan and fake news sources, and as a result largely avoid consuming misinformation (Allen et al., 2020; Guess et al., 2019; Pennycook and Rand, 2019).”
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Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2019) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1806781116 · Cited by 947 · cited 1×
“Second, people generally distrust hyperpartisan and fake news sources, and as a result largely avoid consuming misinformation (Allen et al., 2020; Guess et al., 2019; Pennycook and Rand, 2019).”
Conspiracy theories as part of history: The role of societal crisis situations
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“For instance, they could divert our attention and resources from the real causes of the current information disorder (Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017), such as lack of trust in institutions and high partisan animosity (Osmundsen et al., 2021; Zimmermann and Kohring, 2020).”
BackgroundEvaluating the fake news problem at the scale of the information ecosystem
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“Second, people generally distrust hyperpartisan and fake news sources, and as a result largely avoid consuming misinformation (Allen et al., 2020; Guess et al., 2019; Pennycook and Rand, 2019).”
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Cross-Country Trends in Affective Polarization
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Cited by
Misinformation on Misinformation: Conceptual and Methodological Challenges
Altay, S., Berriche, M., & Acerbi, A. (2023) · Social Media + Society · doi:10.1177/20563051221150412 · Cited by 299
Self-citationMisinformation reloaded? Fears about the impact of generative AI on misinformation are overblown
Simon, F. M., Altay, S., & Mercier, H. (2023) · Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review · doi:10.37016/mr-2020-127 · Cited by 85
“When it comes to new information technologies, such panics might be based on the mistaken assumption that people are gullible, driven in part by the third-person effect (Altay & Acerbi, 2023; Mercier, 2020).”
Self-citationMisinformation on Misinformation: Conceptual and Methodological Challenges
Altay, S., Berriche, M., & Acerbi, A. (2021) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/edqc8 · Cited by 62
Self-citationProminent misinformation interventions reduce misperceptions but increase skepticism
Hoes, E., Aitken, B., Zhang, J., Gackowski, T., & Wojcieszak, M. (2023) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/zmpdu · Cited by 21
Metadata
- Authors
- Altay, S., & Acerbi, A.
- Venue
- New Media & Society
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2023-02-17
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 6440-6461
- ISSN
- 1461-4448 (ISSN-L)
- 1461-7315
- OpenAlex
- W4321219430
- Cited by
- 88
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 37.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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