Conspiracy theories as part of history: The role of societal crisis situations
Open accessAbstract
In the present contribution, we examine the link between societal crisis situations and belief in conspiracy theories. Contrary to common assumptions, belief in conspiracy theories has been prevalent throughout human history. We first illustrate historical incidents suggesting that societal crisis situations—defined as impactful and rapid societal change that calls established power structures, norms of conduct, or even the existence of specific people or groups into question—have stimulated belief in conspiracy theories. We then review the psychological literature to explain why this is the case. Evidence suggests that the aversive feelings that people experience when in crisis—fear, uncertainty, and the feeling of being out of control—stimulate a motivation to make sense of the situation, increasing the likelihood of perceiving conspiracies in social situations. We then explain that after being formed, conspiracy theories can become historical narratives that may spread through cultural transmission. We conclude that conspiracy theories originate particularly in crisis situations and may form the basis for how people subsequently remember and mentally represent a historical event.
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Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
This integrative review argues that belief in conspiracy theories is not unique to the modern digital age or Western cultures, but has recurred throughout history especially during societal crisis situations. It proposes that crisis-induced fear, uncertainty, and lack of control motivate sense-making, and that conspiracy theories can then stabilize into historical narratives transmitted across generations.
Key findings
- Conspiracy theories have not increased over time in the reviewed data: Uscinski and Parent coded 104,803 letters to the New York Times and Chicago Tribune from 1890 to 2010, finding fluctuating but non-increasing conspiratorial content, with spikes shortly before 1900 and in the late 1940s/early 1950s.
- Societal crisis situations—defined as impactful and rapid societal change that calls power structures, norms, or the existence of specific people or groups into question—are proposed to stimulate conspiracy beliefs through fear, uncertainty, and feeling out of control, which increase sense-making motivation.
- Conspiracy theories can become cultural/historical narratives: Gallup polling cited shows JFK conspiracy belief was slightly more than 50% in the 3 years after the assassination, rose to 81% in 1975, stayed above 70% until 2003, peaked again at 81% in the early 2000s, and remains above 60% recently.
- Exposure to conspiracy theories is linked to increased powerlessness and maladaptive intentions, including withdrawal from politics, decreased willingness to reduce one’s carbon footprint, and decreased willingness to vaccinate a child.
Methods
- Design: integrative, theoretical review combining historical observations with psychological literature; no new empirical study is reported.
- Data/sample: historical examples (e.g., AD 64 Rome fire, Jewish conspiracy theories, Holocaust, 9/11, JFK assassination) and prior empirical studies, including Uscinski and Parent’s 104,803 letters, Andeweg’s EU trust/satisfaction data from 1974–2012 and 1997–2012, Gallup JFK polls, and correlational/experimental psychology studies.
- Analysis: narrative synthesis linking societal crisis, uncertainty and lack of control, sense-making, conspiracy belief, and cultural transmission into historical narratives.
Limitations
- Stated: providing an objective definition of “crisis” is difficult because labeling an event a crisis requires subjective judgment and its significance often can only be evaluated in retrospect.
- Stated: no research has yet studied cultural differences in conspiracy belief, so possible cultural differences are speculative; many findings are correlational and cannot establish whether uncertainty causes conspiracy beliefs or vice versa, though experimental work attempts causality.
- Evident from the text: as a narrative review, it does not report a systematic search or meta-analysis, and some claims are explicitly speculative, such as the psychological payoff of conspiracy theories and future trends in JFK conspiracy beliefs.
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Claims the paper makes
0 of 52 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Interpretationnone given
After being formed, conspiracy theories can become historical narratives that may spread through cultural transmission.
“We then explain that after being formed, conspiracy theories can become historical narratives that may spread through cultural transmission.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
People have a fundamental need to understand why events occurred, particularly in the case of negative or unexpected events.
“Since people have a fundamental need to understand why events occurred, particularly in the case of negative or unexpected events (Brückmuller et al., this issue), crisis situations often elicit sense-making narratives among citizens that become part of their representations of history.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Brückmuller et al., this issue
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- Interpretationreasoning
Aversive feelings experienced in crisis-fear, uncertainty, and the feeling of being out of control-stimulate a motivation to make sense of the situation, increasing the likelihood of perceiving conspiracies in social situations.
“Evidence suggests that the aversive feelings that people experience when in crisis—fear, uncertainty, and the feeling of being out of control—stimulate a motivation to make sense of the situation, increasing the likelihood of perceiving conspiracies in social situations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Jewish conspiracy theories-suggesting a Jewish plot to achieve world domination-still fuel anti-Semitism in various parts of the world, such as Malaysia, Turkey, and Poland.
“Jewish conspiracy theories—suggesting, for instance, that there is a Jewish plot to achieve world domination—still fuel anti-Semitism in various parts of the world, such as Malaysia (Swami, 2012), Turkey (Nefes, 2015), and Poland (Golec de Zavala and Cichocka, 2012).”
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- cites Nefes, 2015
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- cites Golec de Zavala and Cichocka, 2012
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- Premisecitation
Hofstadter (1966) noted that conspiracy theories help people comprehend complex events that are difficult to understand otherwise, by attributing these events to a powerful and evil enemy group.
“Hofstadter (1966) noted that conspiracy theories help people comprehend complex events that are difficult to understand otherwise, by attributing these events to a powerful and evil enemy group.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hofstadter (1966)
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- Interpretationreasoning
Conspiratorial anti-Semitism is a recurring issue throughout history.
“Such conspiratorial anti-Semitism is a recurring issue throughout history.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
People who feel powerless are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories.
“Likewise, people who feel powerless are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Imhoff and Bruder, 2014)”
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- cites Imhoff and Bruder, 2014
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- Interpretationreasoning
Conspiracy theories are initiated by the subjective thoughts and feelings that people have when confronted with societal crisis situations.
“These considerations suggest that conspiracy theories are initiated by the subjective thoughts and feelings that people have when confronted with societal crisis situations, such as a fire, a disease epidemic, a war, a plane crash, or a terrorist strike.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Such consequence-cause matching in conspiracy beliefs is due to an increased motivation to make sense of the event.
“Such consequence-cause matching in conspiracy beliefs is due to an increased motivation to make sense of the event (Van Prooijen and Van Dijk, 2014).”
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- Interpretationreasoning
If belief in conspiracy theories is a way of making sense of a situation, then such beliefs are increasingly likely to the extent that people experience uncertainty or a lack of control.
“If belief in conspiracy theories is a way of making sense of a situation, it follows that such beliefs are increasingly likely to the extent that people experience uncertainty or a lack of control.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Measures of trust in, and satisfaction with, politicians closely predict belief in conspiracy theories.
“Although Andeweg (2014) did not directly assess belief in conspiracy theories, measures of trust in, and satisfaction with, politicians have been found to closely predict such beliefs (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994).”
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- cites Goertzel, 1994
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- Interpretationreasoning
There is little evidence for the proposition that conspiracy theories are unique to our digital age.
“Combined with Uscinski and Parent’s (2014) data, these findings offer little evidence for the proposition that conspiracy theories are unique to our digital age.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
People's motivation to make sense of their environment increases when they feel they are not in control of a situation or when they experience subjective feelings of uncertainty.
“It has been noted that people’s motivation to make sense of their environment increases when they feel that they are not in control of a situation or when they experience subjective feelings of uncertainty (Van den Bos, 2009).”
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- Interpretationreasoning
The presence versus absence of crisis situations is a fluid, situational factor that predicts belief in conspiracy theories.
“We propose a fluid, situational factor to predict such beliefs, namely, the presence versus absence of crisis situations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Studies have revealed substantial conspiracy theorizing among citizens around the world, including Eastern Europe, Asia, South Africa, and the Middle East.
“Studies have revealed substantial conspiracy theorizing among citizens around the world, including Eastern Europe (Golec de Zavala and Cichocka, 2012), Asia (Mashuri and Zaduqisti, 2015; Swami, 2012), South Africa (Grebe and Nattrass, 2012), and the Middle East (Zonis and Joseph, 1994).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Golec de Zavala and Cichocka, 2012
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- cites Mashuri and Zaduqisti, 2015; Swami, 2012
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- cites Grebe and Nattrass, 2012; Zonis and Joseph, 1994
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- Premisecitation
Feelings of uncertainty and fear of being out of control predict a general tendency to explain world events through conspiracy theories, including theories conceptually unrelated to the source of uncertainty.
“Feelings of uncertainty, and the fear of being out of control, also appear to predict a more general tendency to explain events that happen in the world through conspiracy theories, however, including conspiracy theories that are conceptually unrelated to the source of uncertainty (e.g. Kossowska and Bukowski, 2015).”
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- Interpretationreasoning
Sense-making is particularly likely to stimulate conspiracy beliefs in a social context that involves hostile or ideologically dissimilar outgroups.
“Such sense-making is particularly likely to stimulate conspiracy beliefs in a social context that involves hostile or ideologically dissimilar outgroups.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
When people experience aversive feelings, they engage in increased sense-making activities in order to imbue a situation with meaning and purpose.
“Put differently, when people experience such aversive feelings, they engage in increased sense-making activities in order to imbue a situation with meaning and purpose.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Crisis situations often elicit sense-making narratives among citizens that become part of their representations of history.
“Since people have a fundamental need to understand why events occurred, particularly in the case of negative or unexpected events (Brückmuller et al., this issue), crisis situations often elicit sense-making narratives among citizens that become part of their representations of history.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Brückmuller et al., this issue
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- Interpretationcitation
There is little evidence to support the idea that conspiracy theories are specific to Western cultures.
“Furthermore, there is also little evidence to support the idea that conspiracy theories are specific to Western cultures.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
People who strongly experience fear of death are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories.
“as are people who strongly experience fear of death (Newheiser et al., 2011).”
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- Premisecitation
Specific impactful societal events, such as the assassination of a president, produce specific conspiracy theories about those events.
“These studies suggest that specific impactful societal events—such as the assassination of a president—produce specific conspiracy theories (i.e. about the assassination).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
People with a relatively strong external locus of control are more likely to report high levels of interpersonal mistrust, paranoia, and belief in conspiracy theories.
“people who have a relatively strong external locus of control—which is a structural tendency to attribute one’s own successes and failures to factors that are out of one’s own control—are more likely to report high levels of interpersonal mistrust, paranoia, and belief in conspiracy theories (Hamsher et al., 1968; Mirowsky and Ross, 1983).”
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- cites Mirowsky and Ross, 1983
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- Premisecitation
LeBoeuf and Norton (2012) found that a political assassination was more likely attributed to a conspiracy if it led to a war than if it did not lead to a war.
“For instance, LeBoeuf and Norton (2012) found that a political assassination was more likely attributed to a conspiracy if it led to a war than if it did not lead to a war.”
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- Premisecitation
Within-country fluctuations in political trust and satisfaction are mostly due to specific historical events and do not reflect structural changes.
“There have been within-country fluctuations throughout the years, but these fluctuations seem mostly due to specific historical events (e.g. economic recession vs prosperity) and do not reflect structural changes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Andeweg (2014)
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- Premisecitation
In an experiment, when a president was killed, people were more likely to believe a conspiracy was behind the attack than when the president survived.
“Results revealed that when the president was killed, people were more likely to believe a conspiracy was behind the attack than when the president survived (McCauley and Jacques, 1979).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites McCauley and Jacques, 1979
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- Interpretationreasoning
Various major crisis events in recent history have inspired substantial conspiracy theorizing.
“Various major crisis events have taken place in recent history, and these events have inspired substantial conspiracy theorizing.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
A desire to make sense of the world is a core motive underlying belief in conspiracy theories.
“More generally, a desire to make sense of the world is a core motive underlying belief in conspiracy theories (see also Bale, 2007).”
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- Premisecitation
When people are anxious and uncertain, they seek to restore control through enhanced cognitive activity to increase comprehension of the situation.
“When people are anxious and uncertain, they seek to restore control through enhanced cognitive activity to increase comprehension of the situation that they find themselves in (see also Park, 2010).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Park, 2010
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- Premisecitation
Exposure to conspiracy theories increases feelings of powerlessness.
“research reveals that exposure to conspiracy theories increases feelings of powerlessness”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Jolley and Douglas, 2014a, 2014b
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- cites Douglas and Sutton, 2015
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- Interpretationnone given
The relationship between societal crisis situations and belief in conspiracy theories is attributable to feelings of fear, uncertainty, and being out of control.
“Second, this relationship between societal crisis situations and belief in conspiracy theories is attributable to feelings of fear, uncertainty, and being out of control.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Societal crisis situations often arouse feelings of fear, uncertainty, or being out of control in people.
- Premisecitation
In the 3 years directly after the JFK assassination, slightly more than 50% of US citizens believed that JFK had been murdered as part of a conspiracy.
“Longitudinal Gallup polling revealed that, in the 3 years directly after the assassination, slightly more than 50% of US citizens believed that JFK had been murdered as part of a conspiracy (see Swift, 2013, for an overview of these Gallup polls).”
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- Premisecitation
Feelings of job insecurity are a main predictor of organizational conspiracy beliefs, that is, employees suspecting their managers of conspiring toward evil goals.
“Results of their study revealed that feelings of job insecurity—that is, uncertainty about whether one’s job will continue to exist in the future—was a main predictor of such organizational conspiracy beliefs”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Van Prooijen and De Vries (2016)
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- Interpretationreasoning
Belief in conspiracy theories is intimately connected with feelings of fear, uncertainty, or being out of control.
“In sum, belief in conspiracy theories is intimately connected with feelings of fear, uncertainty, or being out of control”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
These feelings instigate sense-making processes that increase the likelihood that people perceive conspiracies in their social environment.
“These feelings instigate sense-making processes that increase the likelihood that people perceive conspiracies in their social environment.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Uncertainty stimulates a desire to make sense of one's social environment.
- Interpretationreasoning
Conspiracy theories may spread over time and become part of people's mental representations of important historical events, long after the feelings of uncertainty and fear that the events initially caused have dissipated.
“As a consequence, conspiracy theories may spread over time and become part of people’s mental representations of important historical events, long after the feelings of uncertainty and fear that the events initially caused have dissipated.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
After being formed, conspiracy theories can become part of lay representations of history and are transmitted to new generations as coherent narratives even though people do not experience uncertainty about past crisis situations anymore.
“Third, after being formed, conspiracy theories can become part of lay representations of history and are transmitted to new generations as coherent narratives even though people do not experience uncertainty about past crisis situations anymore.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
It is difficult to account for the longitudinal Gallup numbers on JFK conspiracy belief through emotional processes of uncertainty and fear.
“While uncertainty and fear may have contributed to the genesis of JFK conspiracy theories back in 1963, it is difficult to account for these numbers through these emotional processes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: After the first few years following the JFK assassination, the uncertainty and fear caused by the assassination had dissipated among the public.
- Premisecitation
Various polls suggest that ever since the JFK assassination, the majority of US citizens have believed in one of the conspiracy theories about this event.
“Various polls suggest that ever since this event took place, the majority of US citizens have believed in one of the conspiracy theories about this event (Pipes, 1997).”
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- Interpretationreasoning
Many people who were not even born in 1963 endorse a JFK conspiracy theory.
“Furthermore, taking into account that the figures are very high also in recent years, it is quite likely that many people who were not even born in 1963 endorse a JFK conspiracy theory.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
An uncertainty induction increased belief in conspiracy theories about various societal issues, provided that the relevant authorities were considered immoral.
“Such an uncertainty induction subsequently increased belief in conspiracy theories about various societal issues, provided that the relevant authorities were considered immoral (Van Prooijen and Jostmann, 2013; see also Van Prooijen, 2016).”
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- cites Van Prooijen, 2016
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- Interpretationcitation
Lacking control or subjective uncertainty often increases people's tendency to believe in conspiracy theories.
“Taken together, these findings suggest that lacking control, or subjective uncertainty, often increases people’s tendency to believe in conspiracy theories.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Taken together, these processes might explain why human history is replete with widespread belief in conspiracy theories.
“Taken together, these processes might explain why human history is replete with widespread belief in conspiracy theories.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
For many people, the JFK assassination continues to be a flashbulb memory.
“For many people, the JFK assassination continues to be a “flashbulb memory,” as they still know exactly where they were and what they were doing when they first heard the news (see also Luminet and Spijkerman, this issue).”
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- Interpretationreasoning
These insights can explain why conspiracy theories flourish particularly in societal crisis situations.
“As such, these insights can explain why conspiracy theories flourish particularly in societal crisis situations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Societal crisis situations often arouse feelings of fear, uncertainty, or being out of control in people.
- Premisecitation
Increased feelings of powerlessness lead to maladaptive behavioral intentions such as withdrawal from politics, decreased willingness to reduce one's carbon footprint, and decreased willingness to have a child vaccinated.
“which, in turn, leads to a variety of maladaptive behavioral intentions, such as withdrawal from politics, a decreased willingness to reduce one’s carbon footprint (in response to climate conspiracy belief), and a decreased willingness to have a child vaccinated (in response to vaccine conspiracy beliefs; Jolley and Douglas, 2014a, 2014b; see also Douglas and Sutton, 2015).”
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- cites Douglas and Sutton, 2015
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- Premisecitation
Variation in the number of societal crises over past decades is not visible in the Gallup figures on JFK conspiracy belief.
“There has been variation in the number of crises throughout the past few decades that citizens encountered (e.g. economic recession vs prosperity; war vs peace), but this waxing and waning of societal crises are not visible in the Gallup figures (Swift, 2013).”
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- Interpretationreasoning
Conspiracy theories are not unique to our current time or culture; people of all eras and cultures are likely to believe in conspiracy theories, provided that they are confronted with societal crisis situations.
“First, conspiracy theories are not unique to our current time or culture. People of all eras and cultures are likely to believe in conspiracy theories, provided that they are confronted with societal crisis situations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
In a variety of settings, subjectively experiencing uncertainty or powerlessness is a recipe for conspiracy beliefs.
“These findings underscore that in a variety of settings, subjectively experiencing uncertainty or powerlessness is a recipe for conspiracy beliefs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Participants induced to feel a personal lack of control were subsequently more likely to believe conspiracy theories unrelated to the out-of-control experience than participants who wrote about a less threatening experience.
“Compared to other participants—who had written about a less threatening experience—these participants were subsequently more likely to believe in conspiracy theories that were unrelated to the out-of-control experience”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Whitson and Galinsky (2008)
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- Premisecitation
Minority group members who face real problems such as racial discrimination are more likely than majority group members to attribute these problems to conspiracies.
“Their findings reveal that minority group members who face real problems—such as racial discrimination—are more likely than majority group members to attribute these problems to conspiracies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Crocker et al. (1999)
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- Premisecitation
Conspiracy theories can influence people without their awareness.
“Conspiracy theories also appear to influence people without their awareness (Douglas and Sutton, 2008).”
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- Interpretationreasoning
Conspiracy theories can become coherent historical narratives that are transmitted to future generations as if they were facts, even if the actual facts do not provide compelling evidence for the conspiracy theory.
“Instead, we propose that conspiracy theories can become coherent historical narratives that are transmitted to future generations as if they were facts, even if the actual facts do not provide compelling evidence for the conspiracy theory.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- May combine two claims. 27
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 6
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningSocietal crisis situations have stimulated belief in conspiracy theories and almost invariably elicit conspiracy theories.
“We first illustrate historical incidents suggesting that societal crisis situations—defined as impactful and rapid societal change that calls established power structures, norms of conduct, or even the existence of specific people or groups into question—have stimulated belief in conspiracy theories.”
- Also stated in: § Historical crises and conspiracy theories · boosted
“More important for the present purposes is that societal crisis situations almost invariably elicit conspiracy theories.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § Historical crises and conspiracy theories · boosted
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningConspiracy theories originate particularly in crisis situations and may form the basis for how people subsequently remember and mentally represent a historical event.
“We conclude that conspiracy theories originate particularly in crisis situations and may form the basis for how people subsequently remember and mentally represent a historical event.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningBelief in conspiracy theories has been prevalent throughout human history and a tendency to believe in conspiracy theories is part of human nature.
“Contrary to common assumptions, belief in conspiracy theories has been prevalent throughout human history.”
- Also stated in: § Are conspiracy theories unique to our modern time? · hedged
“A more plausible conclusion, therefore, is that a tendency to believe in conspiracy theories is part of human nature and that people have been susceptible to such beliefs throughout history.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § Are conspiracy theories unique to our modern time? · hedged
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationMost conspiracy theories in history have no evidence to support them.
“While some conspiracy theories have turned out to be true (e.g. the Watergate and Iran–Contra scandals), most conspiracy theories in history have no evidence to support them (Pipes, 1997).”
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Interpretationnone givenPeople often experience societal crisis situations as uncontrollable, and hence they are a cause of substantial uncertainty and anxiety among citizens.
“People often experience such situations as uncontrollable, and hence, they are a cause of substantial uncertainty and anxiety among citizens.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenLacking control and experiencing subjective uncertainty are closely interrelated, and both describe the aversive experience of being in situations where it is unclear what the future may hold.
“The psychological concepts of lacking control and experiencing subjective uncertainty are closely interrelated, and both describe the aversive experience of being in situations where it is unclear what the future may hold.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationIn the 1930s and 1940s, Jewish conspiracy theories were a major part of Hitler's speeches and a potent force in inspiring the Holocaust.
“Back in the 1930s and 1940s, Jewish conspiracy theories were a major part of Hitler’s speeches and a potent force in inspiring the Holocaust (Snyder, 2015).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Snyder, 2015
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenA competitive intergroup setting promotes a need to be vigilant, given that the powerful outgroup may cause more harm in the future, and conspiracy beliefs enable perceivers to estimate what the outgroup is capable of.
“Such a competitive intergroup setting promotes a need to be vigilant, given that the powerful outgroup may cause more harm in the future, and conspiracy beliefs enable perceivers to estimate what the outgroup is capable of.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningConspiracy theories provide people with simplified answers to questions of how a certain crisis situation emerged, and which societal actors can and cannot be trusted.
“Conspiracy theories provide people with simplified answers, specifically to questions of how a certain crisis situation emerged, and which societal actors can and cannot be trusted.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenCrisis situations are likely to have the psychological effect that people become uncertain or feel they cannot control their environment anymore.
“Crisis situations are likely to have the psychological effect on people that they become uncertain or feel that they cannot control their environment anymore.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningMany crisis situations took place, and almost invariably, these crisis situations led large groups of citizens to embrace conspiracy theories.
“Thus, many crisis situations took place, and almost invariably, these crisis situations led large groups of citizens to embrace conspiracy theories.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
PremisecitationThere were two spikes in conspiratorial content in the letters, one shortly before 1900 and one during the late 1940s and early 1950s.
“The first spike occurred shortly before the year 1900, at the height of the second industrial revolution—a period that was characterized by the rise of major companies, quick technological progress, and rapidly changing power structures.”
- Also stated in: § Are conspiracy theories unique to our modern time? · plain
“The second spike occurred during the late 1940s and the early 1950s—a period that marked the beginning of the Cold War.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Uscinski and Parent (2014)
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- Also stated in: § Are conspiracy theories unique to our modern time? · plain
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InterpretationreasoningIt is often easy to connect societal crises to the purposeful misdeeds of hostile groups, making it likely that many citizens consider the possibility of secret conspiracy formation.
“Moreover, it is often easy to connect societal crises to the purposeful misdeeds of hostile groups, making it likely that many citizens consider the possibility of secret conspiracy formation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningConspiracy theories that appear unconnected to a specific societal crisis still make assumptions of a powerful government that deceives citizens, and therefore originate from subjective perceptions of a nation being in crisis.
“However, while these latter conspiracy theories do not emerge from an objectively “real” crisis, they do make assumptions of a powerful government that deceives citizens in a deliberate and highly ingenious fashion. Such conspiracy theories therefore still originate from subjective perceptions of a nation being in crisis.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe extent to which US citizens' published letters to the New York Times and Chicago Tribune contained conspiracy theories fluctuated but did not increase over time between 1890 and 2010, and if there ever has been an 'age of conspiracism,' it is not in the present decade.
“But more interesting was the prevalence of conspiracy theories: The extent to which these letters contained conspiracy theories fluctuated but did not increase over time.”
- Also stated in: § Are conspiracy theories unique to our modern time? · plain
“The core conclusion that emerges from these data is that conspiracy theories have not increased over time, and if there ever has been an “age of conspiracism,” it is not in the present decade.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Uscinski and Parent (2014)
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- Also stated in: § Are conspiracy theories unique to our modern time? · plain
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PremisecitationConspiracy theories spread around the time of the great fire of Rome asserting that Nero and his associates deliberately started the fire to rebuild Rome according to his own vision, and that Nero was singing while Rome was burning.
“Around the same time, however, conspiracy theories started to spread, which asserted that Nero and his associates deliberately started the fire in order to rebuild Rome according to his own vision. In addition, these conspiracy theories stated that Nero was singing while Rome was burning (for a more elaborate description, see Brotherton, 2015).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Brotherton, 2015
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningConspiracy theories address these feelings by enabling precautionary actions to the alleged conspirators-leading to increased vigilance that may be useful in exposing, combating, or avoiding the conspiracy.
“Conspiracy theories address these feelings by enabling precautionary actions to the alleged conspirators—leading to increased vigilance that may be useful in exposing, combating, or avoiding the conspiracy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningPossible cultural differences in conspiracy belief are likely attributable to variations in the extent to which cultures experience uncertainty and fear.
“Furthermore, while no research has yet studied cultural differences in conspiracy belief, our line of reasoning suggests that possible cultural differences are likely to be attributable to variations in the extent to which cultures experience uncertainty and fear (e.g. low- vs high-trust cultures).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningBecause each generation typically faces societal crisis situations, this explains why conspiracy theorizing has been prevalent throughout history.
“As each generation typically faces a range of societal crisis situations, such as revolutions, wars, economic recessions, terrorist attacks, and natural disasters, this would explain why conspiracy theorizing has been prevalent throughout history.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationAcross EU member states, political trust and satisfaction with democracy tend to be low but are not declining.
“The results suggest that although across EU member states political trust and satisfaction tend to be low, they are not declining.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Andeweg (2014)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationEven back in the Roman era, there are prominent examples of conspiracy theories, typically connected to major crisis situations.
“Even back in the Roman era, there are prominent examples of conspiracy theories, and these are typically connected to major crisis situations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Brotherton, 2015
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningA conspiracy theory helps people make sense of the world by specifying the causes of important events, which helps them predict and anticipate the future.
“Put differently, a conspiracy theory helps people to make sense of the world by specifying the causes of important events, which further helps them predict, and anticipate, the future.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationPeople typically make sense of past events as lay historians who rarely base their conclusions on direct historical sources, and they transmit historical narratives based on imperfect memory and other imperfect sources such as folklore, novels, and films.
“It has been noted that people typically make sense of past events as “lay historians” who—unlike professional historians—rarely base their conclusions on direct historical sources. Instead, lay historians transmit historical narratives to others based on their imperfect memory, as well as on other imperfect sources of information such as folklore, novels, films, and the like (see Klein, 2013).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Klein, 2013
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationFew modern European citizens would endorse seventeenth-century witchcraft conspiracy beliefs today, although comparable witchcraft conspiracy theories are still common in parts of the world such as parts of Africa.
“Nevertheless, it is a safe guess that few modern European citizens would endorse such beliefs today (although comparable witchcraft conspiracy theories are still common in other parts of the world, for example, parts of Africa; West and Sanders, 2003).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites West and Sanders, 2003
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe seventeenth-century witchcraft conspiracy theory in all likelihood emerged through similar processes as other conspiracy theories discussed in the article.
“For instance, it was common for citizens to believe that many young women conspired as witches with the Devil back in the seventeenth century, and this conspiracy theory in all likelihood emerged through similar processes as other conspiracy theories discussed in this article.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningThe above-mentioned findings on uncertainty and conspiracy beliefs are correlational and do not reveal whether uncertainty causes conspiracy beliefs or vice versa.
“The above-mentioned findings are correlational, and hence, these studies do not reveal whether uncertainty causes conspiracy beliefs, or vice versa.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationBelieving that the world is filled with evil conspiracies is likely to invoke a host of negative emotions, which may help explain why belief in one conspiracy theory stimulates belief in other conspiracy theories.
“At the same time, believing that the world is filled with evil conspiracies is likely to invoke a host of negative emotions, which may help explain why belief in one conspiracy theory stimulates belief in other conspiracy theories (Goertzel, 1994; Wood et al., 2012).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Goertzel, 1994
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Wood et al., 2012
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningConspiracy theories are initially based on the emotional experiences associated with imminent crisis situations, but they may soon after stabilize into coherent narratives that are part of how people remember the past.
“Be that as it may, our conclusion is that while conspiracy theories are initially based on the emotional experiences associated with imminent crisis situations, they may soon after stabilize into coherent narratives that are part of how people remember the past.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningConspiracy theories may originate through emotional processes of lacking control or feeling uncertain, but at a relatively fast pace they can become coherent narratives that shape people's representations of history.
“Here, we propose that while conspiracy theories may originate through the emotional processes of lacking control or feeling uncertain, at a relatively fast pace they can become coherent narratives that shape people’s representations of history (see also Hilton and Liu, this issue).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hilton and Liu, this issue
Not checked in the free run.
- Rests on an assumption: Uncertainty stimulates a desire to make sense of one's social environment.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningNot all conspiracy theories become historical narratives; the plausibility that people accord to certain conspiracy theories can decrease over time as a function of new insights.
“Not all conspiracy theories make history this way, and in fact, the plausibility that people accord to certain conspiracy theories can also decrease over time as a function of new insights.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationConspiracy theories summarize complex events into a simplified story typically involving a powerful enemy group that deliberately organizes and carries out an evil plan, making them ideally suited for cultural transmission because they are easily understood by lay people.
“The feature of conspiracy theories that they summarize complex events into a simplified story—typically involving a powerful enemy group (i.e. the conspiracy) that deliberately organizes and carries out an evil plan— makes such theories ideally suited for cultural transmission as they are easily understood by lay people (see Bilewicz et al., this issue; Bruckmüller et al., this issue).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Bilewicz et al., this issue
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Bruckmüller et al., this issue
Not checked in the free run.
The paper relies on this without support.
People have a basic need to experience a certain level of control over their environment and to know what to expect from that environment.
“Such experiences are threatening, as people have a basic need to experience a certain level of control over their environment and to know what to expect from that environment.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Feelings of control and certainty enable people to effectively navigate the world by successfully seizing on opportunities, avoiding threats, and making good choices that contribute constructively to one's wellbeing.
“Feelings of control and certainty enable people to effectively navigate the world by successfully seizing on opportunities, avoiding threats, and making good choices that contribute constructively to one’s wellbeing.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Societal crisis situations often arouse feelings of fear, uncertainty, or being out of control in people.
“it is likely that societal crisis situations often arouse such feelings in people.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Uncertainty stimulates a desire to make sense of one's social environment.
“The main underlying process for this connection is that uncertainty stimulates a desire to make sense of one’s social environment.”
The paper relies on this without support.
After the first few years following the JFK assassination, the uncertainty and fear caused by the assassination had dissipated among the public.
“It stands to reason that, after these first few years, the uncertainty and fear that were caused by the Kennedy assassination had dissipated among the public.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Speculation and misinformation about JFK's death can continue to serve as a gateway to further conspiratorial thinking, providing a vocabulary and template applicable in other times of societal unrest and uncertainty.
“speculation and misinformation about his death can continue to serve as a gateway to further conspiratorial thinking, also providing a vocabulary and template to be easily applied in other times of societal unrest and uncertainty (van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017).”
From "Just Asking Questions": Doing Our Own Research on Conspiratorial Ideation by Generative AI Chatbots (2026) · cites this paper as van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017
In “Implications for historical narratives” (page unavailable), the paper uses JFK assassination theories to illustrate how conspiracy narratives can persist and be transmitted across generations. It does not say that speculation about JFK’s death serves as a gateway to further conspiratorial thinking or supplies a template that people apply to later periods of unrest. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
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The entertainment value of conspiracy theories
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COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs: Relations with anxiety, quality of life, and schemas
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van Prooijen, J., & Song, M. (2020) · British Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1111/bjop.12471 · Cited by 110 · see citing works
Shining a spotlight on the dangerous consequences of conspiracy theories
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Conspiracy Theories and Evidential Self-Insulation
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Conspiracy beliefs prospectively predict health behavior and well-being during a pandemic
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“Indeed, conspiracy theories havealways tended to surface in timesof crisis andunrest (van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017).”
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From bad to worse: Avoidance coping with stress increases conspiracy beliefs
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There are higher levels of conspiracy beliefs in more corrupt countries
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The rise and fall of rationality in language
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BERT Model for Fake News Detection Based on Social Bot Activities in the COVID-19 Pandemic
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- Authors
- van Prooijen, J.-W., & Douglas, K. M.
- Affiliations
- VU Amsterdam, The Netherlands; The Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement, The Netherlands
- University of Kent (GB)
- ORCID
- Douglas, Karen M
- Venue
- Memory Studies
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2017-06-29
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 323-333
- ISSN
- 1750-6980 (ISSN-L)
- 1750-6999
- PMC
- PMC5646574
- OpenAlex
- W2601886268
- Semantic Scholar
- a39a4c367f7baa2e4bae6db05f174dc9eb4cfc09
- Cited by
- 764
- References
- 49
- Citations by year
- 2026: 92 · 2025: 116 · 2024: 95 · 2023: 94 · 2022: 164 · 2021: 132 · 2020: 56 · 2019: 10 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 2
- FWCI
- 49.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Memory Studies (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- VU Research Portal (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- Kent Academic Repository (University of Kent) (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- European Commission
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Memory, History, Trauma, Identity
- Keywords
- conspiracy theories, social crisis, fear, uncertainty, sensemaking, historical narratives, cultural transmission, power structures
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-09.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-09.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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