Dimensions of Moral Emotions
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Anger, disgust, elevation, sympathy, relief. If the subjective experience of each of these emotions is the same whether elicited by moral or nonmoral events, then what makes moral emotions unique? We suggest that the configuration of moral emotions is special—a configuration given by the underlying structure of morality. Research suggests that people divide the moral world along the two dimensions of valence (help/harm) and moral type (agent/patient). The intersection of these two dimensions gives four moral exemplars—heroes, villains, victims and beneficiaries—each of which elicits unique emotions. For example, victims (harm/patient) elicit sympathy and sadness. Dividing moral emotions into these four quadrants provides predictions about which emotions reinforce, oppose and complement each other.
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Citations
Cites
When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Moral Intuitions that Liberals may not Recognize
Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2007) · Social Justice Research · doi:10.1007/s11211-007-0034-z · Cited by 2,385 · cited 1×
“While moral judgments concern a number of domains (Haidt & Graham, 2007), the core of right and wrong are the acts—and the people—that cause help or harm (Turiel, 1983).”
BackgroundRozin, P., Lowery, L., Imada, S., & Haidt, J. (1999) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.76.4.574 · Cited by 1,566
Chapter 4 Affect as a Psychological Primitive
Barrett, L. F., & Bliss‐Moreau, E. (2009) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)00404-8 · Cited by 621
The Moral Affiliations of Disgust: A Functional MRI Study
Moll, J., de Oliveira-Souza, R., Moll, F. T., Ignácio, F. A., Bramati, I. E., Caparelli-Dáquer, E. M., & Eslinger, P. J. (2005) · Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology · doi:10.1097/01.wnn.0000152236.46475.a7 · Cited by 355 · cited 1×
“For instance, when viewing villains, the experience of anger should encourage the experience of disgust and vice versa (Moll et al., 2005).”
Background(2003) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195126013.003.0045 · Cited by 343
Blaming God for our pain: Human suffering and the divine mind
Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. (2010) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868309350299 · Cited by 267 · cited 3×
“Studies finding that perceptions of suffering increase blame point to this effect (Gray & Wegner, 2010a).”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Cited by
Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality
Gray, K., Young, L., & Waytz, A. (2012) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2012.651387 · Cited by 1,008
Self-citationThe Theory of Dyadic Morality: Reinventing Moral Judgment by Redefining Harm
Schein, C., & Gray, K. (2018) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868317698288 · Cited by 659
Self-citationThe myth of harmless wrongs in moral cognition: Automatic dyadic completion from sin to suffering.
Gray, K., Schein, C., & Ward, A. F. (2014) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/a0036149 · Cited by 309
Self-citationFeeling our way to machine minds: people's emotions when perceiving mind in artificial intelligence
Shank, D. B., Graves, C., Gott, A., Gamez, P., & Rodriguez, S. (2019) · Computers in Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.chb.2019.04.001 · Cited by 293
Personal experiences bridge moral and political divides better than facts
Kubin, E., Puryear, C., Schein, C., & Gray, K. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2008389118 · Cited by 209
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M.
- Venue
- Emotion Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2011-06-28
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 258-260
- ISSN
- 1754-0739 (ISSN-L)
- 1754-0747
- OpenAlex
- W2110594647
- Cited by
- 119
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 2.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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