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Cited by 209Psychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentSocial and Intergroup PsychologyPsychology of Social Influence

Personal experiences bridge moral and political divides better than facts

Open access
Kubin, Emily, Puryear, Curtis, Schein, Chelsea, Gray, Kurt·2021·Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
DOI 10.1073/pnas.2008389118PMC PMC8017692
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Abstract

Significance: All Americans are affected by rising political polarization, whether because of a gridlocked Congress or antagonistic holiday dinners. People believe that facts are essential for earning the respect of political adversaries, but our research shows that this belief is wrong. We find that sharing personal experiences about a political issue—especially experiences involving harm—help to foster respect via increased perceptions of rationality. This research provides a straightforward pathway for increasing moral understanding and decreasing political intolerance. These findings also raise questions about how science and society should understand the nature of truth in the era of “fake news.” In moral and political disagreements, everyday people treat subjective experiences as truer than objective facts.

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Crossref · 10.1073/pnas.2008389118

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  • In general, sharing personal experiences rather than facts appears to foster respect and humanize politicians, even in the eyes of their adversaries, thereby reducing affective polarization.

    “In general, sharing personal experiences rather than facts appears to foster respect and humanize politicians, even in the eyes of their adversaries, thereby reducing affective polarization292,297.”

    From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [292]

    The General Discussion reports that personal experiences foster more respect for political opponents than facts, and the meta-analyses report greater willingness to interact with them. But the paper says its studies examined everyday Americans and that it is unclear whether the benefits extend to interactions between elected officials. It does not establish that sharing experiences humanizes politicians or reduces affective polarization as a measured outcome. (LLM, conf=0.91)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Sharing subjective experiences is particularly persuasive in shaping perspectives on social issues.

    “given evidence that sharing subjective experiences is particularly persuasive in shaping perspectives on social issues.51”

    From Challenging Race-Based Medicine Through Historical Education About the Social Construction of Race (2023) · cites this paper as [51]

    In “The Power of Personal Experience” (page unavailable), the paper reports research finding that personal narratives can persuade and shift views on contentious issues. But it explicitly says its own studies focus on respect rather than persuasion and leave persuasion aside. It therefore does not establish that sharing subjective experiences is particularly persuasive at changing perspectives. (LLM, conf=0.86)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 19

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Cited by

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Authors
Kubin, E., Puryear, C., Schein, C., & Gray, K.
Affiliations
  • University of Koblenz and Landau (DE)
  • University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (US)
  • University of Pennsylvania (US)
Corresponding author
Gray, Kurt
ORCID
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Publisher
National Academy of Sciences
Published
2021-01-25
Volume
118
Issue
6
ISSN
  • 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
  • 1091-6490
DOI
10.1073/pnas.2008389118
PMC
PMC8017692
OpenAlex
W3123283517
Cited by
209
References
12
Citations by year
2026: 30 · 2025: 52 · 2024: 36 · 2023: 29 · 2022: 40 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 1
FWCI
16.56
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • Charles Koch Foundation (Center for Science of Moral Understanding)
  • NSF | Directorate for Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences (BCS-1823944)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Psychology of Social Influence
Keywords
moral disagreement, political conflict, personal experience, facts, respect, harm, subjective experience, truth judgments, intergroup communication, political polarization, gun control, abortion, Fox News, convolutional neural networks, YouTube comments
MeSH terms
Analysis of Variance, Attitude, Emotions, Humans, Linguistics, Models, Theoretical, Morals, Politics, Rationalization, Social Media

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