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Corporate practices and health: a framework and mechanisms

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Madureira Lima, Joana, Galea, Sandro · 2018 · Globalization and Health

Abstract

BACKGROUND: The Global Burden of Disease estimates that approximately a third of deaths worldwide are attributable to behavioural risk factors that, at their core, have the consumption of unhealthful products and exposures produced by profit driven commercial entities. We use Steven Lukes' three-dimensional view of power to guide the study of the practices deployed by commercial interests to foster the consumption of these commodities. Additionally, we propose a framework to systematically study corporations and other commercial interests as a distal, structural, societal factor that causes disease and injury. Our framework offers a systematic approach to mapping corporate activity, allowing us to anticipate and prevent actions that may have a deleterious effect on population health. CONCLUSION: Our framework may be used by, and can have utility for, public health practitioners, researchers, students, activists and other members of civil society, policy makers and public servants in charge of policy implementation. It can also be useful to corporations who are interested in identifying key actions they can take towards improving population health.

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Fig. 1 Diagram of Dimensions, Vehicles, Practices and Outcomes of Power
Fig. 1 Diagram of Dimensions, Vehicles, Practices and Outcomes of PowerCC BY · PubMed Central

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Metadata

Authors
Madureira Lima, J., & Galea, S.
Venue
Globalization and Health
Published
2018-02-15
Volume
14
Issue
1
Pages
21-21
ISSN
1744-8603 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2794730059
Cited by
192
References
7
FWCI
39.11
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
gold
Funders
  • Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
  • Fulbright Commission

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