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Corporate practices and health: a framework and mechanisms
Open accessAbstract
BACKGROUND: The Global Burden of Disease estimates that approximately a third of deaths worldwide are attributable to behavioural risk factors that, at their core, have the consumption of unhealthful products and exposures produced by profit driven commercial entities. We use Steven Lukes' three-dimensional view of power to guide the study of the practices deployed by commercial interests to foster the consumption of these commodities. Additionally, we propose a framework to systematically study corporations and other commercial interests as a distal, structural, societal factor that causes disease and injury. Our framework offers a systematic approach to mapping corporate activity, allowing us to anticipate and prevent actions that may have a deleterious effect on population health. CONCLUSION: Our framework may be used by, and can have utility for, public health practitioners, researchers, students, activists and other members of civil society, policy makers and public servants in charge of policy implementation. It can also be useful to corporations who are interested in identifying key actions they can take towards improving population health.
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“Power imbalances were described both between corporations (large, for-profit, often trans-national entities) and governments with conflicting interests [30, 33, 34, 39, 43]”
From Defining the commercial determinants of health: a systematic review (2020) · cites this paper as [33]
In the citing paper
“Corporate rights, including intellectual property rights, were described as presenting challenges to many interventions that could benefit public health [16, 33, 34, 43].”
From Defining the commercial determinants of health: a systematic review (2020) · cites this paper as [33]
In the citing paper
“Meanwhile, corporations being afforded similar rights as individuals, but with limited liability, was described as contributing to public health harms, and promoting unethical practice [25, 33, 43].”
From Defining the commercial determinants of health: a systematic review (2020) · cites this paper as [33]
In the citing paper
“The consequences of such agreements relate to occupational conditions, environmental conditions, health systems coverage, tax revenue lost via deregulated global finance systems, the affordability of pharmaceuticals, and national food systems and diets [24, 25, 33, 34, 41].”
From Defining the commercial determinants of health: a systematic review (2020) · cites this paper as [33]
In the citing paper
“This form of power was described as one of three proposed dimensions of power, alongside power to set agendas and make decisions, and power over conflict [33].”
From Defining the commercial determinants of health: a systematic review (2020) · cites this paper as [33]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Madureira Lima, J., & Galea, S.
- Venue
- Globalization and Health
- Published
- 2018-02-15
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 21-21
- ISSN
- 1744-8603 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC5815179
- OpenAlex
- W2794730059
- Cited by
- 192
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 39.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- Funders
- Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
- Fulbright Commission
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