Seeing is Believing: The Role of ‘Preconscious' Perceptual Processing in Delusional Misidentification
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We have no introspective knowledge of the effects of preconscious processing on our perceptions. We are, therefore, not aware that our expectancies may have prejudiced our perceptions. Expectancies tend to foster perceptions with which they are consonant. Therefore false expectations, driven by false beliefs, may result in misperceptions which reinforce those false beliefs. This morbid cycle is central to the delusional misidentification syndromes. This cycle, with positive feedback, is intrinsically unstable, which helps to explain brief episodes of delusional misidentification. Good sensory data, strong links between sense data and memory, and good judgement will all help to prevent misperceptions. The less these constraints are disrupted, the stronger will be the psychological forces needed to generate a delusional misidentification. It is likely that suspiciousness generates particularly assertive effects on preconscious processing of perceptions. Abnormalities of perceptual processing in patients with schizophrenia explain their proclivity to delusional misidentification.
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Citations
Cites
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BackgroundProbabilistic judgements in deluded and non-deluded subjects
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Cited by
From drugs to deprivation: A Bayesian framework for understanding models of psychosis
Corlett, P. R., Frith, C. D., & Fletcher, P. C. (2009) · Psychopharmacology · doi:10.1007/s00213-009-1561-0 · Cited by 367
“Such aberrant changes in beliefs may provide the germ of a delusion and will, moreover if they can account for the aberrant sensory signals, be maintained (Fleminger 1992; Fletcher and Frith 2009; Pally 2005, 2007).”
BackgroundToward a neurobiology of delusions
Corlett, P. R., Taylor, J. R., Wang, X.-J., Fletcher, P. C., & Krystal, J. H. (2010) · Progress in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.pneurobio.2010.06.007 · Cited by 394
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Connors, M. H., & Halligan, P. W. (2015) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01588 · Cited by 205
“…to depend on the same two key criteria in belief evaluation, namely the extent to which the belief explains and predicts their experience of the world (i.e., its observational adequacy), and the degree to which the belief is congruent with other beliefs (i.e., conservation of pre-existing beliefs).”
MODELS OF FACE RECOGNITION AND DELUSIONAL MISIDENTIFICATION: A CRITICAL REVIEW
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Predictive processing, source monitoring, and psychosis
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Models of misbelief: integrating motivational and deficit theories of delusions
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fleminger, S.
- Venue
- British Journal of Psychiatry
- Publisher
- Royal College of Psychiatrists
- Published
- 1992-03
- Volume
- 160
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 293-303
- ISSN
- 0007-1250 (ISSN-L)
- 1472-1465
- OpenAlex
- W2067309082
- Cited by
- 100
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 16.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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