Prototypic Moral Character
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Four studies tested whether moral character is organized as a cognitive prototype. Study 1 involved a free listing of features of virtuous persons. Study 2 required participants to rate each trait on its centrality to good character. Astandard recognition memory paradigm was used in Studies 3 and 4 to test whether participants reported more false recognition of trait attributes that they have not seen but are consistent (virtue central) with the prototype. In both studies, participants reported significant false recognition of novel virtue-central traits than they did virtue-peripheral traits, supporting the claim that a conception of good character is schematically organized around a prototype. Prototype activation had weak and inconsistent effects on recall memory. Implications for understanding moral cognition and identity are discussed.
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Citations
Cites
Toward a cognitive social learning reconceptualization of personality
Mischel, W. (1973) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0035002 · Cited by 3,181 · cited 1×
“However, the validity of the classical trait approach to personality has been long disputed (Block, 1995; Cervone & Shoda, 1999a; Mischel, 1973, 1990; but see Funder, 1991; Kendrick & Funder, 1988) and would not seem to be a promising way to conceptualize the structure of moral character, identity,…”
BackgroundContext theory of classification learning
Medin, D. L., & Schaffer, M. M. (1978) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.85.3.207 · Cited by 3,061 · cited 1×
“…abstract average features of a stimulus set on the basis of typicality, similarity, or family resemblance (as does prototype theory), but argues instead that conceptual categories are represented by collections of stored instances 358 LAPSLEY AND LASKY or examplars (Medin & Schaffer, 1978).”
BackgroundA contrarian view of the five-factor approach to personality description.
Block, J. (1995) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.117.2.187 · Cited by 1,682 · cited 2×
“However, the validity of the classical trait approach to personality has been long disputed (Block, 1995; Cervone & Shoda, 1999a; Mischel, 1973, 1990; but see Funder, 1991; Kendrick & Funder, 1988) and would not seem to be a promising way to conceptualize the structure of moral character, identity, or virtue.”
BackgroundRosch, E. (1975) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(75)90021-3 · Cited by 1,423 · cited 1×
“…demonstrated schematic moral knowledge using prototype ratings and certain statistical (cluster and scaling) techniques, we approached the question using standard experimental procedures for demonstrating the internal structure of concepts (Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Rosch, 1975; Rosch & Mervis, 1975).”
Method
Cited by
The self-importance of moral identity
Aquino, K., & Reed, A. (2002) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1423 · Cited by 3,522
“Although the term moral identity has been used before, earlier discussions have not fully explored the possibility that people’s moral identity may consist of collectively shared, moral characteristics (for exceptions, see Lapsley & Lasky, 2001; Walker & Pitts, 1998).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialMayer, D. M., Aquino, K., Greenbaum, R. L., & Kuenzi, M. (2012) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2008.0276 · Cited by 1,099
Aquino, K., Freeman, D., Reed, A., Lim, V. K. G., & Felps, W. (2009) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0015406 · Cited by 975
Moral character predominates in person perception and evaluation.
Goodwin, G. P., Piazza, J., & Rozin, P. (2014) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0034726 · Cited by 852
Moral identity and the expanding circle of moral regard toward out-groups.
Reed, A., & Aquino, K. F. (2003) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.84.6.1270 · Cited by 672
Metadata
- Authors
- Lapsley, D. K., & Lasky, B.
- Venue
- Identity
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2001-10
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 345-363
- ISSN
- 1528-3488 (ISSN-L)
- 1532-706X
- OpenAlex
- W2068308731
- Cited by
- 184
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 1.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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