The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Do We “do”?
Abstract
A normative framework for modeling causal and counterfactual reasoning has been proposed by Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (1993; cf. Pearl, 2000). The framework takes as fundamental that reasoning from observation and intervention differ. Intervention includes actual manipulation as well as counterfactual manipulation of a model via thought. To represent intervention, Pearl employed the do operator that simplifies the structure of a causal model by disconnecting an intervened‐on variable from its normal causes. Construing the do operator as a psychological function affords predictions about how people reason when asked counterfactual questions about causal relations that we refer to as undoing, a family of effects that derive from the claim that intervened‐on variables become independent of their normal causes. Six studies support the prediction for causal (A causes B) arguments but not consistently for parallel conditional (if A then B) ones. Two of the studies show that effects are treated as diagnostic when their values are observed but nondiagnostic when they are intervened on. These results cannot be explained by theories that do not distinguish interventions from other sorts of events.
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Citations
Cites
Cheng, P. W., & Holyoak, K. J. (1985) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(85)90014-3 · Cited by 1,463
Mental models and counterfactual thoughts about what might have been
Byrne, R. M. J. (2002) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)01974-5 · Cited by 282
Meek, C., & Glymour, C. (1994) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/45.4.1001 · Cited by 159
Cited by
Causal Models: How People Think about the World and Its Alternatives
Sloman, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183115.001.0001 · Cited by 677
Self-citationProbabilistic models of cognition: Conceptual foundations
Chater, N., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Yuille, A. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.05.007 · Cited by 549
Byrne, R. M. J. (2016) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-122414-033249 · Cited by 458
Judgments of cause and blame: The effects of intentionality and foreseeability
Lagnado, D. A., & Channon, S. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.06.009 · Cited by 346
Self-citationBlaisdell, A. P., Sawa, K., Leising, K. J., & Waldmann, M. R. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1121872 · Cited by 287
Metadata
- Authors
- Sloman, S. A., & Lagnado, D. A.
- Venue
- Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2005-01
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 5-39
- ISSN
- 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
- 1551-6709
- OpenAlex
- W2108032050
- Cited by
- 205
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 19.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.