Imitating emotions instead of strategies in spatial games elevates social welfare
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The success of imitation as an evolutionary driving force in spatial games has often been questioned, especially for social dilemmas such as the snowdrift game, where the most profitable one may be the mixed phase sustaining both the cooperative and the defective strategy. Here we reexamine this assumption by investigating the evolution of cooperation in spatial social-dilemma games, where, instead of pure strategies, players can adopt emotional profiles of their neighbors. For simplicity, the emotional profile of each player is determined by two pivotal factors only, namely how it behaves towards less and how towards more successful neighbors. We find that imitating emotions such as goodwill and envy instead of pure strategies from the more successful players reestablishes imitation as a tour de force for resolving social dilemmas on structured populations without any additional assumptions or strategic complexity.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1133755 · Cited by 5,894
Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173179 · Cited by 5,502
Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life
NOWAK, M. A. (2006) · doi:10.2307/j.ctvjghw98 · Cited by 2,438
Sigmund, K. (2010) · doi:10.1515/9781400832255 · Cited by 570 · cited 1×
“Let us enter evolutionary games [2–4], which are frequently employed to help us reveal and understand the mechanisms and reasons why cooperation nevertheless prevails and is in fact much more common than one could assume.”
BackgroundStructured Demes and the Evolution of Group-Advantageous Traits
Wilson, D. S. (1977) · The American Naturalist · doi:10.1086/283146 · Cited by 363
Cited by
Ohdaira, T. (2022) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-022-10582-5 · Cited by 25
Ohdaira, T. (2017) · Chaos, Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2016.12.008 · Cited by 21
Ohdaira, T. (2017) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-017-12742-4 · Cited by 16
Cooperation without punishment
Battu, B., & Rahwan, T. (2023) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-023-28372-y · Cited by 12
Metadata
- Authors
- Szolnoki, A., Xie, N.-G., Wang, C., & Perc, M.
- Venue
- EPL (Europhysics Letters)
- Publisher
- IOP Publishing
- Published
- 2011-10-14
- Volume
- 96
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 38002
- ISSN
- 0295-5075 (ISSN-L)
- 1286-4854
- OpenAlex
- W1968617998
- Cited by
- 119
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 23.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Imitating emotions instead of strategies in spatial games elevates social welfare. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1209/0295-5075/96/38002
- The paper
- Szolnoki, A., Xie, N.-G., Wang, C., & Perc, M. (2011). Imitating emotions instead of strategies in spatial games elevates social welfare. EPL (Europhysics Letters). https://doi.org/10.1209/0295-5075/96/38002
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.