Cited by 21Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesGame Theory and Applications

Characteristics of the evolution of cooperation by the probabilistic peer-punishment based on the difference of payoff

Ohdaira, Tetsushi·2017·Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.chaos.2016.12.008

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45 of 45 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Pool punishment is ineffective when the cost of maintaining central authority outweighs the benefits of cooperation.

    “Specifically, pool punishment is ineffective when the cost of maintaining central authority outweighs the benefits of cooperation.”

    From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [36]

  • Altruistic punishment is ineffective when social interactions are noisy.

    “However, this solution is ineffective when counter-punishments are possible and when social interactions are noisy.”

    From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [36]

  • Altruistic punishment is ineffective when counter-punishments are possible.

    “However, this solution is ineffective when counter-punishments are possible and when social interactions are noisy.”

    From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [36]

  • Punishment-based mechanisms only solve the free-rider problem under restrictive conditions.

    “Unfortunately, numerous studies have shown that punishment-based mechanisms only solve the free-rider problem under restrictive conditions34–38.”

    From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [36]

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Authors
Ohdaira, T.
Affiliations
Aoyama Gakuin University (JP)
Corresponding author
Ohdaira, Tetsushi
Venue
Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2017-02
Volume
95
Pages
77-83
ISSN
0960-0779 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2565745880
Cited by
21
References
45
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 1
FWCI
4.76
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Chaos Solitons & Fractals (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
Keywords
evolution of cooperation, costly punishment, antisocial punishment, sparse connections, dense connections, group size, defectors

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