The Relevance of Self Locating Beliefs
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Can self-locating beliefs be relevant to non-self-locating claims? Traditional Bayesian modeling techniques have trouble answering this question because their updating rule fails when applied to situations involving contextsensitivity. This essay develops a fully general framework for modeling stories involving context-sensitive claims. The key innovations are a revised conditionalization rule and a principle relating models of the same story with different modeling languages. The essay then applies the modeling framework to the Sleeping Beauty Problem, showing that when Beauty awakens her degree of belief in heads should be one-third. This demonstrates that it can be rational for an agent who gains only self-locating beliefs between two times to alter her degree of belief in a non-self-locating claim.
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In the citing paper
“Michael Titelbaum's (2008;2012; see also 2016, p. 674) “Certainty Loss Framework” (CLF) says that Compartmentalized Conditionalization is correct in certain restricted cases: in our terminology, these are cases where, whatever one's evidence might be, there is at most one live center in each possible world.”
From Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence (2022) · cites this paper as Titelbaum 2008
Citations
Cites
Lewis, D. (1979) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184843 · Cited by 1,941
What Conditional Probability Could Not Be
Hájek, A. (2003) · Synthese · doi:10.1023/b:synt.0000004904.91112.16 · Cited by 427 · cited 1×
“(This is one of the objections to systematic constraint (4) made in Hájek 2003.)”
BackgroundSelf-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem
Elga, A. (2000) · Analysis · doi:10.1111/1467-8284.00215 · Cited by 289 · cited 1×
“Adam Elga (2000) argues that Beauty’s degree of belief in heads should be one-third, while Lewis (2001) argues it should be one-half.”
BackgroundBelief and the problem of Ulysses and the sirens
van Fraassen, B. C. (1995) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/bf00996309 · Cited by 262 · cited 1×
“Yet other popular diachronic constraints, such as Jeffrey Conditionalization (Jeffrey 1983) and the Reflection Principle (van Fraassen 1995), also run into problems when applied to stories involving context-sensitive claims.”
BackgroundSleeping Beauty: reply to Elga
Lewis, D. (2001) · Analysis · doi:10.1111/1467-8284.00291 · Cited by 247
Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection
Arntzenius, F., & Journal of Philosophy, I. (2003) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/jphil2003100729 · Cited by 174
Two principles of Bayesian epistemology
Talbott, W. J. (1991) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/bf00419049 · Cited by 165 · cited 1×
“In Titelbaum 2008 I show that Arntzenius’s examples can be properly modeled using (LC), as can similar examples in Talbott 1991. leaves Beauty without a uniquely denoting context-insensitive expression for a significant context-sensitive expression.”
Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection
Arntzenius, F. (2016) · Readings in Formal Epistemology · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_10 · Cited by 161 · cited 2×
“Frank Arntzenius (2003) has described some examples in which the presence of forgetting causes Conditionalization to yield verdicts that do not represent requirements of ideal rationality.”
BackgroundMethod“Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience in Bayesian Confirmation Theory”
Garber, D. (2018) · Testing Scientific Theories · doi:10.5749/j.cttts94f.8 · Cited by 157 · cited 1×
“This approach follows Garber 1983.”
Sleeping Beauty and the Dynamics of De Se Beliefs
Meacham, C. J. G. (2008) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-006-9036-1 · Cited by 139
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Jeffrey, R. C. 1983. The Logic of Decision, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- ———. 1980. “A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance.” In Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, vol. 2, ed. R. C. Jeffrey, 263-94. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Cited by
Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief
Titelbaum, M. G. (2012) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.001.0001 · Cited by 49
Self-citationSelf-Locating Uncertainty and the Origin of Probability in Everettian Quantum Mechanics
Sebens, C. T., & Carroll, S. M. (2018) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 138
Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence
Chalmers, D. J. (2011) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzr046 · Cited by 113
“…under guise q (a structured primary intension), then one's credence in q should be φ. 21 Issues in this vicinity are discussed by Arntzenius (2003), Hitchcock (2004), and Titelbaum (2008), among others. in the ratio formula for conditional probability: p(P|E) = p(P&E)/p(E) = p(E)/p(E) = 1.”
BackgroundAn Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence
Schoenfield, M. (2016) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12329 · Cited by 122
Self-locating Uncertainty and the Origin of Probability in Everettian Quantum Mechanics
Sebens, C. T., & Carroll, S. M. (2018) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axw004 · Cited by 104
“6) advocates a version of the first picture and Vaidman ([2014a], [2014b], [forthcoming]) the second.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Titelbaum, M. G.
- Corresponding author
- Titelbaum, Michael G.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- Duke University Press
- Published
- 2008-10-01
- Volume
- 117
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 555-606
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-1470
- OpenAlex
- W2115954866
- Cited by
- 113
- References
- 21
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 17 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 3 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 32
- FWCI
- 61.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Philosophical Review (publishedVersion)
- HighWire Press Open Archive (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- self-locating belief, Sleeping Beauty problem, conditionalization, context sensitivity, Bayesian updating, degrees of belief
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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