Priority Cosmopsychism and the Advaita Vedānta

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Priority cosmopsychism (PC) is the view that the consciousness of individual sentient creatures is derivative of an underlying cosmic consciousness.

“The combination of panpsychism and priority monism leads to priority cosmopsychism, the view that the consciousness of individual sentient creatures is derivative of an underlying cosmic consciousness.”

• cites Mathews (2011) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Shani (2015) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Nagasawa and Wager (2016) sourcePartly supported

  Section 4.3 (p. 116) defines priority cosmopsychism as holding that the cosmic consciousness is basic and other consciousnesses are derivative of it. But the same section says priority cosmopsychism does not rely on priority monism and remains neutral about their compatibility; it does not support the sentence’s claim that combining panpsychism and priority monism leads to priority cosmopsychism. (LLM, conf=0.88)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

PC maintains that there exists exactly one basic consciousness: cosmic consciousness.

“Parallel to PM's claim that there exists exactly one basic object token, PC maintains that there exists exactly one basic consciousness: cosmic consciousness.”

• cites Mathews (2011) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Shani (2015) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Nagasawa and Wager (2016) sourceSupported

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

PC argues that the phenomenal properties instantiated by creatures like us should be accounted for relative to cosmic consciousness.

“Likewise, PC argues that the physical cosmos as a whole instantiates the most fundamental form of phenomenality (cosmic consciousness), and that the phenomenal properties instantiated by creatures like us should be accounted for relative to cosmic consciousness.”

• cites Mathews (2011) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Shani (2015) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Nagasawa and Wager (2016) sourceSupported

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted).

The Combination Problem is just as daunting as the Problem of Consciousness.

“Critics of PP argue that the problem of explaining how microphenomenal properties, states, or processes might merge to form macro-phenomenal properties, states, or processes is just as daunting as POC itself (e.g., Goff 2009).”

• cites Goff 2009 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

On AM, a non-physical consciousness is the only existing particular, and the internal organization of this unique non-physical consciousness provides the basis for the fallacious appearance of individual selfhood and physical plurality.

“On AM, a non-physical consciousness is the only existing particular, and the internal organization of this unique non-physical consciousness provides the basis for the fallacious appearance of individual selfhood and physical plurality.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

AM is the view that there exists exactly one particular: a consciousness [Brahman].

“(AM) There exists exactly one particular: a consciousness [Brahman].”

May combine two claims.

PC and AVT are similar in that both are committed to the existence of an underlying universal consciousness and see it as the ground for the mental life of individual subjects.

“Both PC and AVT are committed to the existence of an underlying universal consciousness and see it as the ground for the mental life of individual subjects.”

May combine two claims.

AVT holds that physical plurality and individual selfhood are illusory appearances; there are no real macro-level subjects of experience.

“(AVT3) Physical plurality and individual selfhood are illusory appearances: there are no real macro-level subjects of experience (e.g., human consciousnesses).”

• cites Deutsch and Dalvi 2004Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Deutsch (1968)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Sharma (2004)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

PC neutralizes both the Problem of Consciousness and the Combination Problem.

“PC promises to improve on PP because it neutralizes both POC and the Combination Problem.”

May combine two claims.

The 'cosmic' element inherent to PC is absent in AVT, which rejects PC's appeal to realism about the physical cosmos.

“Bottom line: the “cosmic” element inherent to PC is absent in AVT, which rejects PC's appeal to realism about the physical cosmos.”

May combine two claims.

AVT holds that Brahman is not a physical entity instantiating phenomenal properties; it is pure consciousness.

“(AVT2) Brahman is not a physical entity instantiating phenomenal properties: it is pure consciousness.”

• cites Deutsch and Dalvi 2004Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Deutsch (1968)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Sharma (2004)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

PM holds that there exists exactly one basic concrete particular: the whole cosmos.

“(PM) There exists exactly one basic concrete particular: the whole cosmos.”

• cites Schaffer 2010 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

AVT rejects EC1 and EC3: it denies that there exists exactly one concrete particular (the physical cosmos) and that cosmic consciousness is instantiated by the physical cosmos.

“Yet again, in affirming that existence should be attributed exclusively to Brahman (AVT1) and in denying that the physical world is real (AVT2), AVT is bound to reject EC1 and EC3.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted).

EM holds that there exists exactly one concrete particular: the whole cosmos.

“(EM) There exists exactly one concrete particular: the whole cosmos.”

• cites Horgan and Potrč 2008 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

PC faces the Decombination Problem: giving a precise meaning to 'derivative of' in PC4 and explaining how the conscious mental life of creatures like us may originate from cosmic consciousness.

“By reasoning along these lines, PC does face the mirror image of the Combination Problem, one that we can call the Decombination Problem: giving a precise meaning to the expression “derivative of” appearing in PC4 and, correlatively, explaining how the conscious mental life exhibited by creatures like us may originate from cosmic consciousness.”