The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes?
Abstract
The relative strengths of vertical and horizontal tax externalities turn on the balance between the interest responsiveness of the supply of savings and demand for capital, the extent to which immobile factors are taxed by the states, and the strength of preferences between federal and state expenditures. The vertical externality will dominate if the aggregate tax base of the federation is responsible to the state tax instrument. Tax interactions in federations are more complex than has often been supposed.
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Cites
Moffitt, R. A. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.2.660 · Cited by 4,694
Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods
Zodrow, G. R., & Mieszkowski, P. (1986) · Journal of Urban Economics · doi:10.1016/0094-1190(86)90048-3 · Cited by 1,668
A theory of interregional tax competition
Wilson, J. D. (1986) · Journal of Urban Economics · doi:10.1016/0094-1190(86)90045-8 · Cited by 1,150
An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism
Gordon, R. H. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1881778 · Cited by 425
Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy
Wildasin, D. E. (1989) · Journal of Urban Economics · doi:10.1016/0094-1190(89)90034-x · Cited by 414
How responsive is business capital formation to its user cost?
Chirinko, R. S., Fazzari, S. M., & Meyer, A. P. (1999) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(99)00024-9 · Cited by 388
Taxation, Saving and the Rate of Interest
Boskin, M. (1976) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w0135 · Cited by 307
Hayashi, M., & Boadway, R. (2001) · Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d économique · doi:10.1111/0008-4085.00085 · Cited by 259
Decentralized Taxation and the Size of Government: Evidence from Swiss State and Local Governments
Feld, L. P., Kirchgäßner, G., & Schaltegger, C. A. (2010) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.4284/sej.2010.77.1.27 · Cited by 201
Vertical externalities in tax setting: evidence from gasoline and cigarettes
Besley, T. J., & Rosen, H. S. (1998) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(98)00041-3 · Cited by 197
Cited by
The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization
Treisman, D. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511619151 · Cited by 800
Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world
Fan, C. S., Lin, C., & Treisman, D. (2009) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.09.001 · Cited by 538
The Theory of International Tax Competition and Coordination
Keen, M., & Konrad, K. A. (2013) · Handbook of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-53759-1.00005-4 · Cited by 381
Self-citationTax effort and oil royalties in the Brazilian municipalities
Postali, F. A. S. (2015) · EconomiA · doi:10.1016/j.econ.2015.08.001 · Cited by 19
Metadata
- Authors
- Keen, M. J., & Kotsogiannis, C.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2002-02-01
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 363-370
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2092762593
- Cited by
- 345
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 90.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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