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Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world
Open accessAbstract
How does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials? Previous empirical studies, using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization, have suggested conflicting conclusions. In search of more precise findings, we combine and explore two new data sources--an original cross-national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms' concrete experiences with bribery. In countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and (given local revenues) a larger number of local public employees, reported bribery was more frequent. When local--or central--governments received a larger share of GDP in revenue, bribery was less frequent. Overall, the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent-seeking as government structures become more complex.
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Bhattacharyya, S., & Hodler, R. (2010) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.10.004 · Cited by 695
Realising REDD+: national strategy and policy options
A., A., M., B., M., K., E., S., W.D., S., S., W.-K., & (eds.) (2009) · Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) eBooks · doi:10.17528/cifor/002871 · Cited by 663
Zhang, B., Chen, X., & Guo, H. (2018) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.05.009 · Cited by 556
THE IMPACT OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION: A SURVEY
Martinez‐Vazquez, J., Lago‐Peñas, S., & Sacchi, A. (2017) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/joes.12182 · Cited by 421
Pan, X., & Tian, G. G. (2020) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.03.005 · Cited by 347
Metadata
- Authors
- Fan, C. S., Lin, C., & Treisman, D.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2009-02
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 14-34
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1968384976
- Cited by
- 538
- References
- 53
- FWCI
- 67.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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