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Cited by 428

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Optimal Design of Research Contests

Che, Yeon-Koo, Gale, Ian·2003·American Economic Review
DOI 10.1257/000282803322157025
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Abstract

Procurement of an innovation often requires substantial effort by potential suppliers. Motivating effort may be difficult if the level of effort and quality of the resulting innovation are unverifiable, if innovators cannot benefit directly by marketing their innovations, and if the buyer cannot extract up-front payments from suppliers. We study the use of contests to procure an innovation in such an environment. An auction in which two suppliers are invited to innovate and then bid their prizes is optimal in a large class of contests. If contestants are asymmetric, it is optimal to handicap the most efficient one.

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Metadata

Authors
Che, Y.-K., & Gale, I.
Venue
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Published
2003-05-01
Volume
93
Issue
3
Pages
646-671
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1257/000282803322157025
OpenAlex
W2058495110
Cited by
428
References
27
FWCI
12.06
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Optimal Design of Research Contests. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/000282803322157025
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Che, Y.-K., & Gale, I. (2003). Optimal Design of Research Contests. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157025

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.