The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium
Abstract
The following sections are included:The ModelAn Example with a Continuum of StrategiesAn Example with Finitely Many StrategiesDiscussionAppendixReferences
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Citations
Cites
Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173179 · Cited by 5,502
(2011) · SpringerReference · doi:10.1007/springerreference_60360 · Cited by 2,855
A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
Hart, S., & Mas-Colell, A. (2000) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00153 · Cited by 1,088
Self-citationEvolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection
Mezzetti, C., & Samuelson, L. (1998) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061220 · Cited by 806
Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
Aumann, R. J., & Brandenburger, A. (2016) · Readings in Formal Epistemology · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_41 · Cited by 635
Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
Aumann, R. J., & Brandenburger, A. M. (1995) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171725 · Cited by 621
1. Some Topics in Two-Person Games
Shapley, L. S. (1964) · Advances in Game Theory. (AM-52) · doi:10.1515/9781400882014-002 · Cited by 539
On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play
Hofbauer, J., & Sandholm, W. H. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00376 · Cited by 404
Dynamic fictitious play, dynamic gradient play, and distributed convergence to Nash equilibria
Shamma, J. S., & Arslan, G. (2005) · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · doi:10.1109/tac.2005.843878 · Cited by 388
Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium
Foster, D. P., & Vohra, R. V. (1997) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1997.0595 · Cited by 365
Cited by
Prediction, Learning, and Games
Cesa-Bianchi, N., & Lugosi, G. (2006) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511546921 · Cited by 3,162
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning: A Selective Overview of Theories and Algorithms
Zhang, K., Yang, Z., & Başar, T. (2021) · Studies in Systems, Decision and Control · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-60990-0_12 · Cited by 1,264
Dynamic fictitious play, dynamic gradient play, and distributed convergence to Nash equilibria
Shamma, J. S., & Arslan, G. (2005) · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · doi:10.1109/tac.2005.843878 · Cited by 388
Joint Strategy Fictitious Play With Inertia for Potential Games
Marden, J. R., Arslan, G., & Shamma, J. S. (2009) · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · doi:10.1109/tac.2008.2010885 · Cited by 317
Young, H. P. (2009) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.011 · Cited by 286
Metadata
- Authors
- Hart, S., & Mas-Colell, A.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2003-11-01
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1830-1836
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2124666512
- Cited by
- 358
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 16.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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