The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games
Abstract
We compare individuals with two-person teams in signaling game experiments. Teams consistently play more strategically than individuals and generate positive synergies in more difficult games, beating a demanding “truth-wins” norm. The superior performance of teams is most striking following changes in payoffs that change the equilibrium outcome. Individuals play less strategically following the change in payoffs than inexperienced subjects playing the same game. In contrast, the teams exhibit positive learning transfer, playing more strategically following the change than inexperienced subjects. Dialogues between teammates are used to identify factors promoting strategic play.
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Cites
Longitudinal data analysis using generalized linear models
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Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
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Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
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Group versus individual performance: Are N?+?1 heads better than one?
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Will Humans-in-the-Loop Become Borgs? Merits and Pitfalls of Working with AI
Fügener, A., Grahl, J., Gupta, A., & Ketter, W. (2021) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.25300/misq/2021/16553 · Cited by 303
Brandts, J., & Cooper, D. J. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.3.669 · Cited by 272
Self-citationBehavioral development economics
Kremer, M., Rao, G., & Schilbach, F. (2019) · Handbook of Behavioral Economics: Applications and Foundations 1 · doi:10.1016/bs.hesbe.2018.12.002 · Cited by 188
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cooper, D. J., & Kagel, J. H.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2005-06-01
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 477-509
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2040997559
- Cited by
- 464
- References
- 38
- FWCI
- 49.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.