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Crises and Capital Requirements in Banking
Open accessAbstract
We analyze a general equilibrium model in which there is both adverse selection of, and moral hazard by, banks. The regulator can screen banks prior to giving them a licence, audit them ex post to learn the success probability of their projects, and impose capital adequacy requirements. Capital requirements combat moral hazard when the regulator has a strong screening reputation, and they otherwise substitute for screening ability. Crises of confidence can occur only in the latter case, and contrary to conventional wisdom, the appropriate policy response may be to tighten capital requirements to improve the quality of surviving banks.
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Cites
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
Cited by
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Women on board: Does boardroom gender diversity affect firm risk?
Sila, V., Gonzalez, A., & Hagendorff, J. (2016) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.10.003 · Cited by 804
Executive board composition and bank risk taking
Berger, A. N., Kick, T., & Schaeck, K. (2014) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.11.006 · Cited by 682
Jiménez, G., Ongena, S., Peydró, J.-L., & Saurina, J. (2017) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/694289 · Cited by 655
Credit Market Competition and Capital Regulation
Allen, F., Carletti, E., & Marquez, R. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp089 · Cited by 615
Metadata
- Authors
- Morrison, A. D., & White, L.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2005-11-01
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1548-1572
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122638420
- Cited by
- 213
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 15.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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